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2Introduction
1. Introduction: The conceptualization of IP as a “property right”
The analysis of intellectual property as a “property right” has been an 
important feature of the modern debate over the establishment of legal protection of 
information1. The need to institute a property rights system in order to enhance 
inventiveness has always been a contentious issue in the organization of economic 
activity. For some, the patent system is a “huge mistake” as invention arises mainly 
“from a philosophical instinct of contrivance” and creativity.2 Others argued that “by 
offering the prospect of reward for certain types of invention (intellectual property 
rights) do not, indeed, appreciably stimulate inventive activity, which is, for the most 
part, spontaneous, but they do direct it into channels of general usefulness”.3 For 
others, finally, intellectual property rights is a “trivial cost” to society as “an exclusive 
privilege is absolutely necessary in order that what is sown may be reaped”, because 
an inventor “who has no hope that he shall reap will not take the trouble to sow”.4
The debate over the establishment of intellectual property rights and the quest 
of a necessary justification for their institution prefigures the paradox inherent in a 
system where social benefits via technological progress are achieved by means of 
private rewards5. The essence and main objective of intellectual property rights is to 
direct private interest towards the achievement of the community goal of greater 
innovation and increasing economic welfare. This utilitarian explanation of 
intellectual property is usually opposed to the “natural law” approach, which 
emphasizes the existence of moral rights, intrinsically attached to the personality of 
the inventor6. Each person should have a property right in his own ideas, 
independently of any thought about the incentive effects or the consideration of its 
economic costs and benefits.
Utilitarianism remains, however, the dominant explanation for intellectual 
property (IP) rights. Three theories embrace the utilitarian approach.
 The “reward” theory is the most traditional justification for establishing a 
property rights protection for ideas and is relevant to any type of IP. According to this 
theory, the inventors should be rewarded for the risks and the investment of time and 
effort they have made in order to develop a useful to society invention. The reward 
takes the form of a property right protecting the inventors from free riders. In the 
absence of this exclusive right, free riders would be able to use the invention without 
making the investment of time, effort, skill or money required to actually invent it.7
Indeed, if a firm could not recover the costs of invention because of free riding, then 
we could expect a suboptimal level of innovation.8 The assumption is that during the 
                                                
1 For a survey see, S. N.S. Cheung, Property Rights and Invention, 8 Res. L. & Econ. 5, 6 (1986).
2 F.W. Taussig, Inventors and Money-Makers (1930), quoted in N.S. Cheung, Property Rights and 
Invention, above n 1, 7.
3 A.C. Pigou The Economics of Welfare (1960) at 183-185 quoted in N.S. Cheung, Property Rights and 
Invention, above n 1, 7
4 J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. J. Bowring 71 (1843) quoted in N.S. Cheung, 
Property Rights and Invention, above n 1, 6.
5 R P Merges & J F Duffy Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials (Lexis Nexis, 2002), 2. 
6 M. Fisher, Classical Economics and Philosophy of the Patent System (2005) I.P.Q. 1, 6.
7 B. Sherman & L. Bently The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1999), 15-24 consider that the shift from occupancy to mental labor as the source of property right 
provided the first form of justification for instituting property rights on ideas.
8 K. W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, (1994) 23 J. Legal Stud. 247.
3existence of the exclusive right the inventors should be in a position to recover their 
investments on research and development. 
The incentive theory goes further. The objective of granting IP rights is not 
only to compensate the inventor but also, by providing a “spectacular prize”, to give 
incentives to other potential inventors to make the necessary efforts to innovate.9 The 
process of innovation can be compared to a lottery in which the extent of the 
investments in a new technology “is motivated by the longshot hope of a very large 
reward”.10 The objective of the exclusive right will be to provide a prospect of a large 
reward, not a mere recoupment of fixed costs.
Most recently, granting IP rights, in particular patents, has been justified by their 
conceptualization as market instruments: patents are used as “an exchange currency to 
access a specific third-party technology, which can only be traded against other IP 
rights”11, or as a means to attract private investment. This is particularly significant in 
new technologies such as biotechnology, where firm’s average size is relatively small 
and broad IP rights may help these firms to attract venture capital.12 If one follows 
this theory, intellectual property rights, in particular patents are an instrument to 
attract private investment and therefore they should be granted, irrespective of the 
value of the invention itself, which is an issue that will be decided by the capital 
markets. This broad foundation of IP rights will, however, increase the risk of 
anticommons, which may ultimately affect innovation.13
Most legal systems adopt the utilitarian view of IP rights and base their 
assessment both on the reward and the incentives thesis. However, this is just one 
aspect of regulating innovation. Public authorities should also strike a balance 
between the need for invention and creation, on the one hand, and the need for 
diffusion and access, on the other. Keith Maskus explains that 
“in setting rules governing IPRs, societies must strike a balance between the needs 
of inventors to control exploitation of their new information and the needs of 
users, including consumers and potential competitors working on follow on 
inventions and innovations. Stated another way, the system should find an 
appropriate balance between creating and disseminating intellectual property 
[…] In this context, the system should (1) allow market based incentives for 
creation, (2) try to minimize the costs of innovative activity, and (3) provide for 
timely disclosure of innovation or creation and reasonable fair use with economic 
and social goals in mind.14”
The issue is to create an optimal for society balance between the necessary reward 
or incentives of the inventor and the need to disseminate innovation. This is the 
dilemma that mainly explains tensions between antitrust and intellectual property. 
Innovation serves as the common objective of competition law and intellectual 
property, but both of them accord different importance to the aims of reward and 
                                                
9 J. A. Schumpeter Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1974), 73 quoted by F.M. Scherer, The 
Innovation Lottery, in R. Dreyfuss, H First & D. Zimmerman (ed.) Expanding the Boundaries of 
Intellectual Property (OUP, 2001), 3.
10 Ibid., 20.
11 D. Guellec & B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Economics of the European Patent System
(OUP, 2007), 87.
12 J. Lerner, The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis, (1994) 25 Rand. J. Econ. 319, 
325-326 ; Y. Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, (1992) 102 Yale L. J. 
777, 800.
13 M. A. Heller. The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 
(1998) 111 Harvard L. Rev. 621.
14 K. E. Maskus Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (2000), 32-33. Emphasis added.
4dissemination. If antitrust emphasizes dissemination, intellectual property aims to 
ensure that creators have appropriate incentives to engage in creative activities, which 
may imply, but not necessarily, the existence of a reward scheme for the investment 
made15.
The tension between the objectives of intellectual property and competition law 
makes necessary the elaboration of a justification for granting IP rights. It is not the 
first time that intellectual property found itself in a defensive position. The “literary 
property” debate of the 18th century and the “patent controversy” of the 19th century 
were the result of the collision of copyright and patents with respectively the 
principles of common law and free trade and engendered an important debate on the 
theoretical underpinnings of intellectual property16. The narrative of property 
appeared in both periods as playing an “ex post facto role in legitimating” the granting 
of property rights in ideas.17 It also served as a useful organising concept for all the 
different forms of IP rights that have emerged.18 The adoption of international 
Treaties on intellectual property, within the WTO or the WIPO strengthened the 
importance of IP rights while at the same time restricted governments’ discretion in 
applying their competition law statutes.19
Considered as a form of property, IP rights benefit from a high level of esteem and 
legal protection that could lead to a weak application or even non-application of 
competition law. Indeed, property rights are of constitutional value. In the United 
States, the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment to the Constitution explicitly provide that 
property constitutes a fundamental right that shall not be taken for public use (by the 
federal government) without just compensation. In Europe, they are generally 
protected by the Constitutions of the European Union member States20, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and by the first additional Protocol of the European Convention 
of Human rights (ECHR), also integrated in European Union law.21 The rhetoric of 
                                                
15 I. Rahnasto Intellectual Property Rights, External Effects and Anti-trust Law (OUP, 2003), 64 (‘the 
dissemination of innovations and creative works is not necessarily seen as the primary goal of 
intellectual property systems. Rather, the encouragement of innovations and creative works is the goal 
of the system’); Mark Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust, 13 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 
237 (2007).
16 On the “literary controversy” see, C. May & S.K. Sell Intellectual Property Rights – A Critical 
History (Lynne Rienner, London, 2005), 87-97; B. Sherman & L. Bently, above n 7, 11. On the “patent 
controversy” see F. Machlup & E. Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century (1950) 
10 Journal of Economic History 1-29.
17 B. Sherman & L. Bently above n 7, 206.
18 Ibid . 194.
19 H. Ullrich, Expansionist intellectual property protection and reductionist competition rules: a TRIPS 
perspective, in K. Maskus (ed), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) 726–57.
20 European Union law does not impose member States a specific conception of property and is neutral 
to its private or public character (article 295 of the EC Treaty). See also, Opinion of Advocate General 
Capotorti delivered on 8 November 1979, Case 44/79, Liselote Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] 
ECR 3727, 3747.
21 According to article 6, subsection 2 of the Treaty of the European Union, “the Union shall respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as a result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States as general principles of Community law”. See also, Article 17 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
“1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired 
possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest 
and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation 
being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law insofar as 
is necessary for the general interest.
5“property rights” therefore plays an important role in defining a framework for the 
interface between intellectual property and competition law, which would be largely 
positive to IP rights22.
Nonetheless, property rights are not absolute. European Union law emphasizes 
the “social function” of property, according to which property rights can be restricted 
for reasons of public interest, provided that those restrictions in fact “do not 
constitute, as regards the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference 
which infringes upon the very substance of the rights thus guaranteed.”23 Competition 
law constitutes a “general interest” objective that can justify a restriction on the scope 
of property rights. In Frankfurt Airport the European Commission acknowledged that 
competition rules of the EC Treaty may be considered as restrictions on the right of 
property which correspond to the objectives of general interest pursued by the 
Community.24 The terminology of “property rights” does not therefore create an 
antitrust immunity for IP rights, as their use can be restricted any time they contribute 
to a competition law infringement.
The European courts interestingly drew a distinction between the existence 
and the exercise of an intellectual property right25. In principle, the existence of the IP 
right, in other words its “specific subject matter” or essential function cannot be 
affected by competition law. However, the distinction does not provide a safe harbour 
for IP rights as the ECJ has considered as abusive practices that fall within the scope 
of the “specific subject matter” of the IP right26. The Court also gives a broad 
definition to the term “exercise”, thus keeping an important discretion as to the scope 
of the application of competition law27.
While not being able to provide an immunity status to IP rights, the “property 
rights” approach does not also contribute to the understanding of the necessity of 
balancing the objectives of reward and dissemination in order to attain an optimal 
equilibrium between the two. Indeed, the criterion of “property” is formalistic and 
does not take into account the evolution of economic structures. It does not provide 
any useful information as to the level of reward or incentives that should be 
guaranteed for the inventor, nor any standard for the adequate level of dissemination 
in order for the IP right’s scope to be optimal. The concept of “property right” is not 
used with the aim to emphasize the instrumental character of intellectual property in 
                                                                                                                                           
2. Intellectual property shall be protected.”
22 I. Rahnasto above n 15, 57 (‘(p)art of the property theory is that the rights, duties and privileges 
accompanying the property are absolute and universal’).
23 Case 265/87, Herman Schräder HS Kraftfutter GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Gronau, [1989] ECR 2237, 
para. 15.
24 Commission Decision 98/190, FAG-Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG, OJ [1998] L 72/30, para. 90. 
This is also a conclusion reached by Advocate General George Cosmas in Masterfoods Ltd v. HB Ice 
Cream Ltd, Opinion delivered on May 16 2000, Case C-344/98, Masterfoods Ltd. v. HB Ice Cream 
Ltd., ECR I-11369 [2000]
25 Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission, [1966] ECR 299 at 345; Case 24/67 Parke 
Davis & Co. v. Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm [1968] ECR 55 at 62.
26 Joined Cases C-241/91P & C-242/91P Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) [1995] ECR I-743, paras 48-50; I. Govaere The Use and Abuse of Intellectual 
Property Rights in EC Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), page 149.
27 V. Korah Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules (Oxford, Hart Pub. 2006), 3-4, 
(‘(i)n ruling that an important difference rests on a distinction, which cannot be drawn by logical 
analysis, the ECJ created a very flexible instrument for it to develop the law and reduce the possibilities 
of dividing the Common Market through the use of national or regional intellectual property rights’). 
On the demise of the distinction between existence and exercise, see Commission Decision 
AstraZeneca (June 15, 2005), para 741, nyr.
6order to achieve greater innovation and economic welfare. On the contrary, 
economists adopt an instrumental approach and consider that granting property rights 
is as a form of collective action in the marketplace along with other tools such as 
direct regulation, liabilities, rewards and taxes.
 The parallel drawn with physical property is therefore not helpful in 
determining the adequate balance between reward and dissemination. It is remarkable 
that both those favouring a less activist antitrust policy against IP rights and those 
advocating a more careful consideration of the effects of intellectual property 
protection to competition adhere to the “property rights” logic of intellectual property, 
while supporting opposite conclusions28. The concept of “property rights” does not 
however provide a clear-cut and operational criterion for the interface between 
competition law and intellectual property.
This study will argue that Intellectual property rights present distinct 
characteristics than physical property rights (Section 2). It will then focus on the 
possible areas of conflict between competition law and intellectual property. These 
should not be considered as fixed and should follow the evolution of recent antitrust 
law and economics learning (Section 3). The inadequacy of the “property rights” 
terminology for intellectual property becomes obvious if one examines the antitrust 
law standards that apply to unilateral refusals to license intellectual property, which 
are different from those that apply to tangible property rights. Competition law takes 
into account the specificities of intellectual property by requiring additional 
conditions for finding that a refusal to license an IP right constitutes a competition law 
infringement. However, the emergence of multiple standards concerning the analysis 
of refusals to license illustrates the difficulties of finding the right balance between IP 
and competition law. The concept of “property” is not helpful in reaching a point of 
equilibrium between the different objectives pursued and other concepts have been 
used instead (Section 4). Another possibility would be to “internalize” competition 
law concerns within the boundaries of IP29 (Section 5).
These solutions are nonetheless imperfect as they perceive intellectual 
property and competition law as autonomous disciplines, normatively closed to each 
other. Indeed, once competition law concerns have been integrated into intellectual 
property or the opposite, the link between the two weakens and each of the 
“transplants” evolves according to its new environment, without taking necessarily 
into consideration the transformations incurred in its original setting. This 
disconnection is one of the setbacks of the “property rights” rhetoric in the 
competition law-intellectual property interface. Considered as “property” or 
something more than normal property, IP rights may be subjected to a specific, more 
or less deferential, antitrust standard, whose application and effects will not consider 
the aims pursued by the establishment of these specific IP rights at the first place. This 
absence of a continuous cognitive relationship between the two disciplines highlights 
the closure of the systems, which is a consequence of the “property rights” logic30. It 
is submitted that the constitution of a dialectical relation between the two disciplines 
                                                
28 Compare C Ritter, Refusal to Deal and Essential Faciltiies: Does Intellectual Property Require 
Special Deference Compared to Tangible Property?, (2005) 28 World Competition 281; S. Gevenaz, 
Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual Property: Why Antitrust Law Should 
Not Distinguish Between IP and Other Property Rights, (2004) 19 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 741 who take a 
more activist antitrust standpoint with C. Ahlborn, D. Evans & J. Padilla, The Logic & Limits of the 
Exceptional Circumstances Test in Magill and IMS Health, (2004) 28 Fordham Int’l L. J.  1109.
29 I. Rahnasto above n 15, 36.
30 On the closure of the of intellectual property system see, B. Sherman & L. Bently above n 7, 194.
7will be facilitated if intellectual property is perceived as a form of industry specific 
regulation. The last part of this study will examine the regulatory theory of intellectual 
property as well as the implications of this theory for the antitrust/IP interface, in 
particular in the biotechnology sector (Section 6). Section 7 will conclude.
2. Intellectual property should not be conceptualized as a property right
The “property right” nature of IP seems to play an important role in building 
an argument for a strong protection of IP rights. The concept of property rights is very 
board. It is often linked to the freedom of action of a property owner31. The paper will 
adopt a narrow definition, building on the economic theory of property rights (A). It
will then turn to the issue of the application of the economic theory of property rights 
to IP (B).
1.1 Economic theory of property rights
Economic theory views property rights are a way to deal with externalities. 
Harold Demsetz was one of the first to argue that “property rights convey the right to 
benefit or harm oneself or others”, suggesting a close relationship between rights and 
externalities.32 Externalities (or external effects) exist any time one party’s action 
“influences, or may influence with a probability, the well-being of another person, in 
comparison to some standard of reference”33. Externalities are negative when they 
have a detrimental effect to others (than the right holder) and positive, when they have 
a beneficial effect on others. The kind of external effects that arise in the absence of 
private property rights can be illustrated by comparing different types of ownership 
with open access.
According to Demsetz, there are three types of ownership: (a) “communal 
ownership”, which he defined as the “right which can be exercised by all members of 
the community” (but this falls short of open access, as members of other communities 
are excluded from the exercise of the right); (b) “private ownership”, which “implies 
that the community recognizes the right of the owner to exclude others from 
exercising the owner’s private rights” and (c) “state ownership”, which ‘implies that 
the state may exclude anyone from the use of a right as long as the state follows 
accepted political procedures for determining who may not use state-owned 
property.34” Property regime is generally opposed to open access.35
                                                
31 C. A. Reich, The New Property, (1964) 73 Yale L.J. 733, 771 (‘[property] performs many different 
functions. One of these functions is to draw a boundary between public and private power. Property 
draws a circle around the activities of each private individual or organization. Within that circle, the 
owner has a greater degree of freedom than without. Outside, he must justify or explain his actions, and 
show his authority. Within he is master, and the state must explain and justify any interference. It is as 
if property shifted the burden of proof; outside the individual has the burden; inside, the burden is on 
government to demonstrate that something the owner wishes to do should not be done’). 
32 H. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 (1967) The American Econ. Rev. 347, 348, 
“[…] a primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater 
internalization of externalities”.
33 S. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard Univ. Press 2004), 76.
34 Ibidem, at 350.
35 T. Eggerstsson, Open access versus Common property, T. L. Anderson & F. S. McChesney (ed.) 
Property Rights - Cooperation, Conflict, and Law (Princeton, 2003) 73.
8Open access is not a problem as long as the supply of a resource is so great 
relative to the demand that there is no (net) gain from conserving or improving it.36
Nevertheless, when an open access resource becomes scarce, individuals lack the 
incentive to conserve it “because they cannot capture the full gains from doing so.37” 
This situation is often described as “the tragedy of the commons”.38 Open access may 
create adverse effects on the supply and demand side of the market for the particular 
resource. Eggerstsson explains that
“joint wealth is not maximized on the supply side because of insufficient 
supply of resource units caused by inadequate provision, maintenance, and 
investment in improvement. Wealth is not maximized on the demand side 
because of excessive (inefficient) withdrawal of resource units.39”
The use of a resource by one person will have external effects on the welfare 
of others, as it will immediately reduce the amount of the resources available for 
consumption. The establishment of property rights may avoid these externalities by 
internalizing the benefits and the costs of the exploitation of the scarce resource, thus 
enhancing their more efficient use. Exclusive property rights enable individuals to use 
scarce resources and exclude others from using them.40 The cost for society to create 
property rights is explained by the great value of the resource, which is linked to its 
scarcity. The value of the scarce resource is a parameter to consider in granting 
property rights. If the scarce resource is of limited value, the potential benefits 
resulting from the property right may not cover the costs of its creation41. Open access 
will in this case be the most effective regime.42 The main function of property rights is 
therefore to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger 
than the cost of internalization.
It is also important to make a distinction between private and common 
property. Common property regimes create transaction costs. They increase 
negotiating costs because the communal property owners would have to reach 
agreement in order to allocate efficiently the communal use of the property.43 In 
addition, communal property will create externalities because “the full costs of the 
activities of an owner of a communal property right are not borne directly by him, nor 
can they be called to his attention easily by the willingness of others to pay him an 
appropriate sum.44” In comparison, private property solves the problem of 
                                                
36 L. De Alessi, Gains from Private Property: the Empirical Evidence, in Property Rights-Cooperation, 
Conflict, and Law above n 35, 90, at 91.
37 Ibid.
38 G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162 (December), 1243-1248. The idea is not 
absent from Aristotle’s writings. See, Politics, Book II (sec. 1261b of Jowett translation), “that which is 
common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it, […]Everyone thinks chiefly of his 
own, hardly at all of the common interest, and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For 
besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another 
to fulfill […]” quoted in H. Demsetz, Property Rights, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and 
Economics (Palgrave, 1998), 144, 144.
39 T. Eggerstsson, Open Access versus Common Property, above n 35, 77.
40 Ibid, at 81.
41 A. A. Alchian & H. Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, (1973) 33 Journal of Economic History
16, 24, “if private right can be policed easily, it is practicable to resolve the problem by converting 
communal rights inot private rights”.
42 Ibid, at 83.
43 H. Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, above n 32, 356, “(u)nder the communal property 
system the maximization of the value of communal property rights will take place without regard to 
many costs, because the owner of a communal right cannot exclude others from enjoying the fruits of 
his efforts and because negotiation costs are too high for all to agree jointly on optimal behavior”.
44 Ibid.
9externalities (because of the scarcity of the resource) and the problem of transaction 
costs by concentrating costs and benefits on owners, creating therefore incentives to 
use resources more efficiently.45 One should nevertheless be cautious in transposing 
the economic theory of property rights to IP rights, because of the specific 
characteristics of property rights on information.
1.2. Differences between the economic theory of property rights and the economic 
theory of intellectual property
Intellectual property law creates property rights on information if the social 
value of this information exceeds the cost of its development46. The premises do not 
seem to be different than in physical property rights47. Nonetheless, there are 
important differences between the two, requiring a more cautious approach for 
intellectual property.48 My objective is not to argue that intellectual property is not 
“property”, for the simple reason that there are differences between property rights on 
ideas and on tangible resources, but to stress the inadequacy of the extension by 
analogy to intellectual property of the legal regime of property rights on tangible 
goods.49
1.2.1. Intellectual property and the free rider argument
The need to allow the property owner to capture in full the returns of her 
investment and to avoid free riding is generally emphasized as one of the main 
justifications for instituting property rights. This justification is not self-evident for 
intellectual property rights. Indeed, it is difficult to accept on its face the idea that 
overuse of the intellectual property rights by free riders will create a tragedy of the 
commons. Information may be considered as a pure public good. The “consumption” 
of information by one person does not diminish the possibility of its consumption by 
another. Simultaneous (or joint) consumption is possible. The necessity to confer 
property rights in order to avoid congestion externalities, which is the usual rationale 
for physical property rights, is not so compelling. The consumption of the good is non 
rivalrous and it is also difficult to exclude others from its use.
It is not therefore surprising that many authors have criticized the use of the 
scarcity rationale (tragedy of the commons) for intellectual property rights as being 
tautological. According to Arnold Plant,
“it is a peculiarity of property rights in patents (and copyrights) that they do 
not arise out of the scarcity of the objects which become appropriated. They 
are not a consequence of scarcity. They are the deliberate creation of statute 
law; and, whereas in general the institution of private property makes for the 
preservation of scarce goods, tending […] to lead us to ‘make the most of 
them’, property rights in patents and copyright make possible the creation of a 
                                                
45 Ibid., “the externalities that accompany private ownership of property do not affect all owners, and 
generally speaking, it will be necessary for only a few to reach an agreement that takes these effects 
into account. The cost of negotiating an internalization of these effects is thereby reduced 
considerably.”
46 S Shavell Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard Univ. Press, 2004), 138.
47 H. Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, above n 32, 359. 
48 M. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, (2005) 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1059.
49 Contra on the need to develop a unifying theory of property, J. F. Duffy, Intellectual Property, 
Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, (2005) 83 Texas L. Rev. 1077.
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scarcity of the products appropriated which could not otherwise be 
maintained.50”
Plant’s argument is that a patent system, by granting exclusive rights, creates itself the 
scarcity it is using afterwards as a rationale for the creation of intellectual property 
rights.
Two arguments have been opposed to this theory. Steven Cheung argued that 
one should distinguish between inventions that would have been produced in the 
absence of any property rights protection and those that would not have been 
produced without protection because “for any invention which would not have been 
produced at all in the absence of property rights, the scarcity is not in ‘ideas’ as such” 
but rather lies “in the resources required to produce the ideas themselves.”51 The 
overuse of the information by free riders decreases the value of the resource for the 
inventors who will find it more difficult to recoup their fixed costs. As a result, their 
incentives to innovate will diminish and the level of provision of this good would be 
below the socially optimal level.
One could also distinguish between the scarcity that existed before and that 
which came after the property rights were created.52 According to Harold Demsetz, 
“for the discovery to yield value, even to a monopoly owner of the rights to the 
discovery, it must alleviate the scarcity that existed before its discovery”53. However, 
“viewed ex ante, the possibility that ownership may be associated with monopoly 
does not necessarily exacerbate, and may reduce, the severity of scarcity-caused 
problems.54”
If we start from the assumption that without any prospect of a future reward, 
nobody will invest in developing new ideas, it is desirable to ration the use of 
information. It is a conscious decision of the public authority to create scarcity by 
conferring property rights on information. The artificial scarcity will create additional 
value and will avoid a market failure, in the sense that without property rights the 
price mechanism would not be able to take into account the full social costs and 
benefits of the production and consumption of information, because of the free rider 
problem.
 The additional value created by innovation will be appropriated by the 
property right owner. Property rights are therefore absolute in the sense that there is 
no limit settled on the value that the property owner can get. Indeed, it would be 
possible to appropriate more value than what was initially necessary for the 
generation of the invention. This optimal value would include the total costs and may 
also go far beyond. The optimal level of remuneration will vary as incentives can be 
different from industry to industry. The situation will conclusively be economically 
efficient, as the property owner will be able to internalize the full amount of external 
effects (negative and positive).
It is irrelevant that the property right may lead to the exclusion of other 
individuals from the use of this particular resource (here information)55. These effects 
constitute pecuniary externalities and as such they should not be considered. This 
                                                
50 A. Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, (1934) 1 Economica 34.
51 S. Cheung, Property Rights and Invention, above n 1, 10.
52 H. Demsetz, Property Rights, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics, above n 38, 151.
53 Ibid, at 152
54 Ibid.
55 I assume for the moment that this is a situation of a stand-alone innovation and not that of a 
cumulative innovation. Regarding the later, the initial innovator would be able to appropriate more of 
the rewards from the invention, which may have the result to hinder independent follow-on innovators 
from having the incentive to invest on research and development and produce valuable information.
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conclusion stems from Ronald Coase’s theorem that absent transaction costs, a mutual 
beneficial outcome will anyway be achieved between the owner of the resource and 
the individuals that would like to have access to it56. However, pecuniary externalities 
may be relevant if we decide to take into account distributional justice concerns. 
Moreover, even if one focuses only on efficiency considerations and takes for 
granted the assumption that this is a stand-alone innovation, it is important to 
recognize that property rights on information can be efficiently created only if, in their 
absence, the inventive effort would not have been made at the first place57. The 
benefice of a first mover advantage may be an adequate reward that may induce the 
firm to innovate, without enjoying the additional benefit of an intellectual property 
right. In addition, granting a property right on information requires a trade-off 
between the need to encourage innovation and the protection of the interest of the 
consumers58. This is an important difference with physical property rights and 
highlights the inherent  instrumentalism of intellectual property.
1.2.2. Intellectual property as business assets: an information cost approach
Intellectual property rights on information may also make it easier for 
innovators to commercialize their inventions and conclude transactions with other 
economic units59. This creates a market for the transformation of the inventions into 
commercially viable products. Indeed, an inventor will not always be able to develop 
commercially her invention and will need to bargain with other firms that will provide 
her the necessary capital and commercial expertise. This could also be used as an 
argument for the institution of tangible property rights. However, in reality, 
transaction costs are higher concerning intellectual property, because of “the frequent 
difficulty of identifying such property”, which by definition has no unique physical 
sight.60 This risk is particularly important in the case of cumulative innovation, as the 
fragmentation of intellectual property rights may lead to extensively complex 
transactions involving an important number of parties, thus increasing the costs of 
bargaining.61 According to Landes and Posner, “this difference argues for less 
extensive propertization of intellectual than of physical property62” as the costs of 
internalization may be more important than the external costs that are internalized. 
Indeed the public good character of information makes it difficult to identify the free 
riders and therefore to assure an effective protection, thus increasing the costs of 
internalization. In conclusion, the high transaction costs of intellectual property can be 
considered as an important reason for adopting a more cautious approach in creating 
property rights on information than tangible property rights.
                                                
56 R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, (1960) 3 Journal of L. & Econ. 1.
57 M. Lemley, Ex Ante versus ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, (2004) 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
129.
58 W. Nordhaus Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change
(Cambridge, MIT 1969).
59 Federal Trade Commission (FTC), To Promote Innovation – The Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law and Policy, (hereinafter FTC Report), October 2003, chap. 2, at 5. See also, S. Ghosh, 
Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, (2004) 19 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1315 (arguing that patents should be considered as “business assets”).
60 W. Landes & R. Posner The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Harvard Univ. Press, 
2003), 16.
61 M. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, (1999) 108 Yale L.J. 1163, 1174.
62 W. Landes & R. Posner, above n 60, 8.
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1.2.3. Prospect patents and the innovation incentives theory
Another important difference between intellectual property and tangible 
property is that according to the “innovation incentives” theory, the objective is not 
only to reward the inventor for the investments made, which could also be considered 
as a rationale for physical property rights, but, in addition, to provide an economic 
stimulus for innovation.
The acquisition of an intellectual property right is often the outcome of a race 
to innovation. This is particularly important concerning patents (“patent races”). 
Firms are investing in order to be the first to file an application to the Patent Office or 
to have invented the particular product or process63. This race may lead to rent 
seeking behavior, excessive investments and duplication of efforts that will be finally 
wasted as it would have been more efficient to use these resources for other 
productive activities. The risk of rent-seeking behavior is more pronounced for 
intellectual property rights than physical property rights.
Some authors go even further and argue that the risk of rent-seeking behavior 
does not question the existence of intellectual property rights but, on the contrary, 
could be used as an argument for granting property rights on information at an earlier 
stage of the inventive process64. The objective is to allow patent holders to coordinate 
innovative efforts within the area covered by the patent and thus develop the 
“prospect” of future research. These “prospect patents” have a scope “that reaches 
well beyond what the reward function would require”.65 Contrary to the reward theory 
the prospect development theory is forward looking and constitutes an “ex-post 
justification” of intellectual property.66
A prospect patent places its owner in a position “to coordinate the search for 
technological and market enhancement of the patent’s value so that duplicative 
investments are not made and so that information is exchanged among the searchers”, 
thus avoiding inefficient races to invent.67 The initial innovator can also make the 
necessary investments without incurring the risk that the fruits of the investment will 
be appropriated by competitors.68 The prospect theory of patents assumes that the 
initial inventor is the best suited for accelerating second-generation innovations. The 
validity of this assumption has nevertheless been questioned69 and ultimately rests on 
the belief that innovation is best achieved in a situation of monopoly.70 This 
hypothesis has not yet been empirically verified and many economic studies insist on 
                                                
63 There is a difference between the patent regimes in the United States and in Europe concerning 
patent  priority. The United States follow a “first to invent” rule, while in Europe priority is awarded to 
the first inventor to file a patent application.
64 E. W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, (1977) 20 J.L. & Econ. 265.
65 Ibidem, at 267.
66 M. Lemley, Ex ante versus ex post justifications for intellectual property, (2004) 71 Chi. L. Rev. 129.
67 E. W. Kitch, above n 64, 267.
68 Ibid.
69 See, M. Lemley, Ex ante versus ex post justifications for intellectual property, above n 66, 141 
(2004), “[…] prospect theory is needed when control over subsequent development is a necessary part 
of the incentive to produce the pioneering invention in the first place, as is arguably true with 
pharmaceuticals. Prospect theory as a justification for displacing the market for invention, by contrast, 
is not a helpful justification for intellectual property”; See also the references quoted in the FTC 
Report, above n 59, chap. 2, at 19-20. For a restatement of this theory but without this time taking a 
propert rights approach, see J. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, (2004) 71 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 439. 
70 This is the classic “Schumpeterian Hypothesis” according to which larger firms innovate more than 
smaller firms, and firms in concentrated markets innovate more than firms in competitive markets  
13
the importance of independence and competition for innovation.71 Whatever the 
outcome of this debate will be, incentives to innovate are not explicitly considered in 
granting physical property rights, which also explains the differences in the legal 
regime of intellectual property and physical property.
1.2.4. A different legal regime than physical property rights
A quick look to the legal regime that applies to intellectual property is enough 
to convince of the need to avoid simplistic analogies with physical property rights. 
First, according to Spence an important difference is that “intellectual property rights 
do not exclude others from the enjoyment of the relevant subject matter, but only 
from its use in one of a broadly or narrowly defined range of ways”.72 The limited 
duration of intellectual property rights is certainly a characteristic that does not exist 
as such for normal property rights.73 Once the duration of a patent has expired, that 
which has been protected is on the public domain (open access) and can no longer be 
owned as property. One could also add the conditions of validity of a patent. A 
patentable invention should be novel, non-obvious, capable of industrial application 
and must not fall “as such” within any of the categories of subject-matter specifically 
excluded.74 These conditions do not have a counterpart in the law of tangible 
property.
1.2.5. The intervention of public authorities in the definition of IP rights
The intervention of the public authorities is also more systematic and intensive 
for IP rights than for tangible property rights and starts from the granting of the 
property right. For example, the examination of the conditions of patentability is done 
by the relevant Patent Office. This highlights the most important difference between 
intellectual property rights and property rights on physical things: the intervention of 
an independent regulatory agency. Landes and Posner make the point when they 
remark that
“equating intellectual property rights to physical property rights overlooks the 
much greater governmental involvement in the former domain than in the 
latter, at least in a mature society in which almost all physical property is 
privately owned, so that almost all transactions involving such property are 
private. Government is continuously involved in the creation of intellectual 
property rights through the issuance of patents, copyrights and trademarks. 
Skeptics of government should hesitate to extend a presumption of efficiency 
                                                
71 For a more extensive analysis see, FTC Report, chap. 2, at 14-15. See also, ABA, Section of Antitrust 
Law, The Economics of Innovation: A Survey, July 2002, 33-35 (which concludes that the “the results 
that relate concentration to innovation are sensitive to industry characteristics). See also, R. Gilbert, 
Looking  for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate?, in 6 Innovation 
Policy and the Economy 159 (A. B. Jaffe, J. Lerner & S. Stern, eds. 2006); R. J. Gilbert, Competition 
and Innovation (Competition Policy Center Paper CPC 07-069, January 27, 2007). available at 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC07-069
72 M. Spence, The Mark as Expression/The Mark as Property, (2005) 58 Current Legal Problems, 491, 
494.
73 The doctrine of adverse possession may limit the duration of a normal property right. However, the 
effects of the adverse possession are different to the extent that “adverse possession shifts ownership 
from one person to another, whereas the expiration of a fixed-duration intellectual property rights 
eliminates ownership and makes the work a part f the public domain”. W.M. Landes & R.A. Posner, 
above n 60, 34.
74 W. Cornish & D. Llewelyn, Intellectual Property, (5th ed., Sweet & Maxwell), 173. 
14
to a process by which government grants rights to exclude competition with 
the holders of the rights”75.
Landes and Posner do not argue that the judiciary is not involved in the 
enforcement of these rights, but that the definition of the scope of these rights, 
especially patents, is done mainly by an administrative agency, under the control of a 
specialist court76. Specialist courts cannot be considered as equivalent to generalist 
courts as it is more likely to have a mission orientation and favor a broad scope of 
protection for intellectual property rights. This is not necessarily the case in all areas 
of intellectual property, as generally trademarks, trade secrecy and publicity rights 
laws appear to be rather common law oriented and thus efficient. The importance of 
this point should not be underestimated. By considering that intellectual property 
rights are not common law rights but simple creations of an administrative process, it 
is possible to argue that they should not benefit from the thesis of the efficiency of 
common law77 and should therefore have a different legal regime than normal 
property rights. It follows that the possible areas of conflict between IP and 
competition law may not be the same than those that exist between competition law 
and physical property rights
2. Intellectual property and competition law: possible areas of conflict
By granting an exclusive right, intellectual property offers the opportunity to 
the right holder to earn extra profits. The consumers of the particular good embodying 
the IP right will consequently loose because the level of output of the particular good 
will be lower than in the absence of an exclusive right. A tension between intellectual 
property policy and competition policy will result as the objective of the later is to 
maximise consumer welfare. However, if the right holder didn’t have the opportunity 
to overprice the good, there would be suboptimal incentives to commit resources to 
investment at the first place. The assumption is that if no intellectual property right 
was granted, the consumers would benefit from less innovation. The term 
“innovation” covers, according to Joseph Schumpeter the following five cases:
“(1) the introduction of a new good – that is one with which consumers are not 
yet familiar – or of a new quality of a good. (2) The introduction of a new 
method of production, that is one not yet tested by experience in the branch of 
manufacture concerned, which need by no means be founded upon a discovery 
scientifically new, and can also exist in a new way of handling a commodity 
commercially. (3) The opening of a new market that is a market into which the 
particular branch of manufacture of the country in question has not previously 
                                                
75 W. Landes & R. Posner, above n 60, 415. Contra R.E. Meiners & R. J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, 
and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly?, (1990) 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 911, 916-917, “patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks granted recognition by the State are essentially the same as recognition by 
the State of claims in real property […] They are like common-law rights, valuable not to specific 
groups that obtain the passage of the statutes but to all current and future members of society who will 
have equal access to property and the enforcement of ownership rights by the judicial system”.
76 Indeed, the Federal Circuit was established in 1982 in the United States
77 W. Landes & R. Posner above n 60, 417 remark that common law refers to “any body of law that is 
judged created”, “it refers not only to judge-created bodies of law but also to judge-created doctrines 
that fill gaps or resolve ambiguities in statutes or constitutions. In this sense, much of antitrust law, 
much of constitutional law, and much of patent and copyright law are common law”. According to B. 
Bouckaert, What is Property?, (1990) 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 775, 790, “the origin of intellectual 
property rights has its historical roots in deliberate interventions by political authorities rather than in a 
spontaneously evolved continental legal tradition”. 
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entered, whether or not this market has existed before. (4) The conquest of a 
new source of supply of raw materials or half-manufactured goods, again 
irrespective of whether this source already exists or whether it has first to be 
created. (5) The carrying out of the new organization of any industry, like the 
creation of a monopoly position (for example through trustification) or the 
breaking up of a monopoly position”78.
The European Commission seems to adopt this broad definition of “innovation”79. 
Not any type of innovation should, however, be protected by intellectual property 
rights; only those whose value to the consumers is more important than the cost of the 
intellectual property rights’ protection mechanism. 
The difficult trade off between the long-term effects of IP rights on incentives 
to innovate and their short-term effects on output and prices will be an important issue 
in the interface between competition law and intellectual property. Indeed, in theory, 
intellectual property law focuses more on the long-term effects, while competition 
law’s focal point has traditionally been primarily on the short-term effects of a 
business practice on consumer welfare.
 Innovation and long-term effects on consumer welfare have been recently 
brought in competition law analysis. The European Commission’s Guidelines on the 
application of article 81(3) of the Treaty examine the effects of a particular agreement 
on innovation80 while they also integrate dynamic efficiencies as possible 
compensating factors of an otherwise anticompetitive agreement restricting output 
and increasing prices81. The “balancing test” of the Commission has the objective to 
ensure that these “qualitative efficiencies”, such as new and improved products, will 
create “sufficient value for consumers to compensate for the anti-competitive effects 
of the agreement, including a price increase”.82 This is because “(t)he availability of 
new and improved products constitutes an important source of consumer welfare”.83
The assessment of pro and anti-competitive effects is an arduous task as it is difficult 
to assign precise values to dynamic efficiencies in order to conduct a cost benefit 
analysis.84 Similarly, competition law takes into account the effect of commercial 
practices on innovation markets.85 One could therefore conclude that intellectual 
property law shares with competition law a common dynamic conception of 
“consumer welfare”.
There are usually two understandings of this concept. Competition law 
economists generally distinguish between total welfare, sometimes also referred to as 
consumer welfare86, and pure consumer welfare (consumer surplus or distributive 
                                                
78 J Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development (London, Transaction Pub., 2005), 66. The 
book was first published by Harvard Univ. Press in 1934.
79 European Commission, Green Paper on Innovation, COM(1995) 688 final, which defined innovation 
as “the renewal and enlargement of the range of products and services and associated markets; the 
establishment of new methods of production, supply and distribution; the introduction in changes in 
management, work organization and the working conditions and skills of workforce”.
80 European Commission, Guidelines on the application of article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ 
C101/97 paras 24 &25.
81 Ibid, at para 70.
82 Ibid., at para 102.
83 Ibid. at para 104.
84 Ibid. , at para 103.
85 Ibid., at para 25. For a critical and comparative analysis see, M. Glader, Innovation Markets and 
Competition Analysis (Edward Elgar, 2006).
86 R H Bork The Antitrust Paradox – A Policy at War With Itself (New York, The Free Press, 1993) at 
111, “[…] it seems clear the income distribution effects of economic activity should be completely 
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consumer welfare). Both serve as alternative standards for evaluating the effect of 
business practices to competition.
Total welfare is a measure that aggregates the welfare or surplus of different 
groups in the economy (in general consumer and producer surplus). Producer surplus 
refers to the sum of all profits made by producers in the industry, while consumer 
surplus refers to the aggregate difference between the consumers’ valuation for the 
good considered (or what he wants to pay) and the price that he has to pay for. A 
situation is economically efficient and thus increases total welfare when after this 
situation has occurred, either both producer and consumer surplus increased or one of 
them increased in such a way that it could potentially compensate the loss suffered by 
the other (Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). For example, if producers’ profits are more 
important than the loss incurred by consumers, so that they could potentially 
compensate them, the practice is economically efficient. Total welfare completely 
overlooks the issue of income distribution among producers and consumers.
Pure consumer welfare does not place the interest of the consumers at the 
same level than that of the parties to the particular business practice. The distribution 
of income matters. Consumers should be better of, or at least at the same position they 
were before the particular business practice intervened. A practice that increases the 
profits of the producer and decreases the profits of the consumers in such a way that it 
is still possible for producers to compensate the consumers’ loss will still be 
considered as detrimental to society and therefore prohibited.
What are the implications of a strong intellectual property protection for total 
and consumer welfare? By offering the possibility to the IP holder to increase prices, 
IP rights may decrease output and therefore total welfare. However the dynamic 
efficiencies brought by IP may largely compensate the losses. The effect of IP to 
consumer welfare will depend on the question to know if the “monopolistic” profits 
generated by the exclusive right of the IP holder will be passed on to the consumers in 
a way or another. This will not necessarily take the form of lower prices, but may 
simply be better quality, new products or services and enhanced consumer choice. A 
broad intellectual property protection may nevertheless harm consumers in the long 
run if this will have the effect to restrict cumulative innovation. This possibility raises 
two issues: the importance of cumulative innovation to economic welfare and the 
relation between innovation and market structure as a competitive structure may not 
generate more innovation than a more concentrated one.
Indeed, one can distinguish between two types of innovation: stand alone 
innovation, which refers to the situation where the IP right will not be used as an input 
to another innovation and cumulative innovation, which refers to the situation where 
successive innovations build upon earlier innovations. It is widely accepted that 
cumulative innovation substantially increases social value. As Newton once wrote, 
“(i)f I have seen further it is by standing on ye shoulders of Giants”. Public authorities 
recognize this reality by establishing innovation clusters, such as the Silicon Valley in 
the United States, which provide the possibility for information exchange and the 
development of research synergies.87 Cumulative innovation may take three different 
varieties: either the second innovation could not be invented without the first, either 
the first innovation reduces the cost of achieving the second, or the first innovation 
                                                                                                                                           
excluded from the determination of the antitrust legality of the activity. It may be sufficient to note that 
the shift in income distribution does not lessen total wealth […]”.
87 For an analysis of the Silicon Valley model in product system development, see M Aoki, Toward a 
Comparative Institutional Analysis (The MIT Press, 2001), at 347.
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accelerates the development of the second by providing new research tools.88 The 
social value of the innovation process is, in this case, unequally distributed between 
the first and the second innovator. It will therefore be important to find the right 
incentive mechanism in order to ensure that earlier innovators are compensated 
adequately for establishing the foundations for later innovators, while also making 
sure that cumulative innovators still have an incentive to innovate. The original design 
of intellectual property rights should take into account the need to compensate both 
the initial and the subsequent innovators.
It is, however, practically impossible to consider ex ante all the possibilities of 
cumulative innovation in designing the initial intellectual property right as, by 
definition, cumulative innovations have not yet been produced. Confronted with the 
demands of subsequent innovators to use the first-generation innovation, the IP 
holders face a strategic choice: either they will encourage cumulative innovation 
either they will refuse to license their inventions and therefore block innovation. They 
may have the interest of doing so only if the cumulative innovation may be in a 
position to compete with them in the market of the second-generation product or in 
the market of the first-generation product, covered by the intellectual property right. 
This will indirectly affect consumers as, in the absence of cumulative innovation, 
these will not benefit from new products and services. However, one should also take 
into account that in the case of a refusal to license, the IP right holders incur the risk 
that their rivals may develop a competing technology, which will provide alternatives 
to the first-generation innovation. The initial design of intellectual property rights will 
also affect the bargaining position of the parties to the licensing agreement.
Usually the IP right owner will not have the interest to refuse to license. There 
is an important literature explaining that, in high technology sectors, competitors 
usually share information by publishing their research and do not systematically have 
recourse to intellectual property protection in order to appropriate part of the social 
value created by cumulative innovation.89 In publishing the results of their research, 
the initial innovators weaken their bargaining position in the licensing negotiation 
process. By the same token they increase the potential reward of the cumulative 
innovators by maintaining their incentives to innovate ex ante. Oren Bar-Gill and
Gideon Parchamovsky argue that this disclosure strategy is also to the interest of the 
IP right holder as the revenues that an initial inventor can derive from cumulative 
innovation via licensing may easily trump the profits that the initial inventor can 
secure on its own without licensing out her technology. In fact, facilitating rather than 
excluding cumulative innovation will often be in the best interest of the initial patent 
holder.90
 Nevertheless, the private interest of the IP right holder will not always 
coincide with the goal of promoting cumulative innovation. The IP right owners 
might likely decide to exclude competition, but the simple fact that the refusal to 
license will have the effect to exclude rivals from the market is not enough to infer a 
competition law infringement but it should also be possible to plausibly explain it by 
an anticompetitive harm story.
One of the most commonly used doctrines in EC competition law is the 
leverage theory, which explains that, by refusing to license, the monopolists seek to 
                                                
88 S. Scrotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Protecting Cumulative Innovators, ed. S 
Scrotchmer Innovation and Incentives (MIT Press, 2005) at 139.
89 O. Bar-Gil & G. Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, (2003) 89 Va. L. Rev. 1857; 
Yoshai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, (2002) 112 Yale L. J. 369.
90 O. Bar-Gil & G. Parchomovsky, above n 89, at 1859.
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extend their monopoly power to a downstream related market91. This theory has been 
criticized by the Chicago school of antitrust economics, which argued that an 
upstream monopolist has no interest in leveraging its monopoly power to a related 
market because it is possible to gain only one monopoly profit overall (single 
monopoly profit theorem).92
The economic grounding of the theory has nevertheless been revigorated by 
some recent economic studies. Whinston criticized the assumptions of the Chicago 
school and argued that, in certain circumstances, a monopolist in a market A will 
follow a leveraging strategy by using tying practices as a commitment value in order 
to signal to its actual or potential competitors in the downstream market B that they 
will face aggressive competitive behaviour, which will decrease their profits.93 They 
will thus be less inclined to enter the market or they could be finally excluded from it, 
if they were present. This strategy is profitable if the tied goods are complements in 
fixed proportions.
Choi and Stefanadis also developed a model in which the incumbent firm will 
have the interest to extend its monopoly from one market to another if the two 
products are complements and the new entrant can effectively enter the market for 
one of the two product only if it has successfully innovated in  both markets.94 Indeed, 
as the two products are components, the cumulative innovators’ rents will be 
dissipated. They would therefore not be able to capture the social value of their 
innovation in one market because the products are complements and will not have the 
interest to innovate. The strategy of the dominant firm will thus pre-empt the 
emergence of cumulative innovation.
The essential facilities doctrine is inspired by the leverage theory but presents 
certain specific characteristics. It is a legal doctrine framed by some earlier decisions 
of the U.S. courts, which considered that under specific circumstances, firms have 
affirmative duties to assist their competitors.95 Indeed, the “monopolist’s control of an 
essential facility (sometimes called bottleneck) can extend monopoly power from one 
stage of production to another, and from one market into another.”96 Under the 
essential facilities doctrine, a vertically integrated monopolist will be required to share 
some input in a vertically related market with a firm operating in a downstream 
market. This will be the case if it is feasible for the monopolist to provide the facility, 
the competitor would be reasonably and practically unable to duplicate it and the 
denial of the use of the facility will deprive the competitor of an essential input, thus 
offering the opportunity to the dominant firm to extend its monopoly power in an 
related market. Contrary to the traditional leverage theory, the essential facilities 
doctrine has a structural and not a behavioural component, in the sense that “a 
monopolist’s status (as the owner of the facility and a competitor in the market that 
                                                
91 L. Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, (1985) 85 Colum. L. Rev. 515.
92 W. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, (1957) 67 Yale L.J. 19; R Posner 
Antitrust Law (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2001), 198-200.
93 M. D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion, (1990) 80 American Econ. Rev. 837.
94 J.P. Choi, Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation and the ‘Leverage Theory’, (1996) 110 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 1153; J.P. Choi & C. Stefanadis, Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage 
Theory, (2001) 32 Rand Journal of Economics 52.
95 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Associated Press v. United States, 326 
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relies on the facility) rather than any affirmative conduct determines liability.”97 The 
application of the essential facilities doctrine has been extended to a wide variety of 
“facilities” owned or controlled by a monopolist. Commentators seem increasingly to 
question the existence of the essential facilities doctrine as a valid basis for antitrust 
liability98 and recent case law in the United States has placed limitations on its use.99
The doctrine continues nonetheless to have some significance in Europe.100
 A distinct theory of anticompetitive effects is that dominant firms may use IP
rights to create barriers to entry and raise the costs of their rivals.101 They will 
therefore have the opportunity to increase profitably their prices, up to the level of 
their rivals’ increased costs and exercise market power or profitably undercut rivals’ 
prices and drive them out of the market. IP rights may facilitate raising rival costs 
strategies if the technology covered by the IP right is a valuable input. Rubinfeld and 
Maness underscore that IP owners may use their IP portfolio strategically to raise 
their rivals’ costs by creating a “patent thicket”, which includes patents whose validity 
is questionable (“submarine patents”) or by adopting a strategy of “patent flooding”, 
in which “a firm files a multitude of patent applications that claim minor variations on 
a competitor’s existing technology”.102 These strategies will have the advantage, 
according to the same authors, to “require little or no short-run profit sacrifice to 
achieve the desired long-term goal of lessening competition in the marketplace”, but 
may achieve a number of anticompetitive effects, such as foreclosure, predatory 
pricing and tacit collusion.103 Indeed, competitors will face a difficult choice: either 
they litigate the validity of the patents or they accept a license and pay the fee or 
finally they design their products “around the patent”.104 All these practices will 
increase their costs, reduce their incentives to innovate and facilitate collusive 
practices as, in most cases, the dispute will lead to an anticompetitive patent 
settlement105 or a cross-licensing scheme.106 The IP owners could also offer a 
predetermined bundle of licenses to their competitors (package licensing), even if the 
later do not need the whole package. This will have the effect to limit their rivals’ 
                                                
97 H Hovenkamp, M.D Janis & M.A. Lemley, Unilateral Refusals to License in the US, F Lévêque & H 
Shelanski (ed.) Antitrust, Patents and Copyright - EU and US Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2005), 12, 
18.
98 See, A B Lipsky & J G Sidak, Essential Facilities, (1999) 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1187, 1191-1192.
99 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415 n4 (2004). The 
Supreme Court has recently held in Trinko that for a leverage claim to succeed there must be a 
“dangerous probability of success” in monopolizing a second market.
100 See, Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission [2007] 5 CMLR 846, para. 1344, 1347 & 1363. For a 
comparison of EC and US antitrust law on the doctrine of essential facilities see, Alexandros Stratakis, 
Comparative Analysis of the US and EU Approach and Enforcement of the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine, 27(8) ECLR 434 (2006).
101 T G Krattenmaker & S C Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve 
Power Over Price, (1986) 96 Yale L.J. 209.
102 D.L. Rubinfeld & R. Maness, The Strategic Use of Patents: Implications for Antitrust, in F Lévêque 
& H. Shelanski (ed.) Antitrust, Patents and Copyright - EU and US Perspectives above n 97, 85. 
103 Ibid, at 87.
104 Ibid., at 97.
105 H Hovenkamp, M Janis, M A Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 
(2003) 87 Minn. L. Rev.  1719.
106 The possibility of cross-licensing may also have anticompetitive effects. As is explained by A B 
Jaffe & J Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents (Princeton Univ. Press, 2004), 60, “[…] companies 
are like countries in an arms race: since the terms of the cross-licensing agreement are driven by the 
size and quality of each company’s patent portfolio, every company wants to have the best portfolio, in 
order to be in the strongest position in cross-licensing negotiations”. This will create a wasteful race to 
patents filling and may result in bad quality patents.
20
choice and reduce their incentives to innovate, thus restraining competition in the 
final goods market.107
The aforementioned theories of anticompetitive harm relate to strategies that 
affect the competitive advantage of the monopolist’s rivals in a related market with 
the aim to extend her market power in a secondary market. An alternative claim of 
anticompetitive effect is that the dominant firm will seek to maintain its monopoly 
power on the primary market of the technology covered by the IP right. This 
maintenance of monopoly claim will usually be integrated in a sequential innovation 
scheme.108 Carlton and Perloff give the example of a two-period setting with a firm 
that operates in a primary market and a market for a complementary good109. Due to a 
patent, the firm has, in a first period, a dominant position in the primary market. 
However, in a second period, the incumbent monopolist faces the risk of entry of an 
alternative producer into the primary market. According to their model, although the 
alternative producer has a superior complementary product in both periods, his 
primary product is of equivalent quality only in the second period.
The strategy of the alternative producer will be to use the profits earned by 
selling units in the complementary market to cover its fixed costs of entering the 
primary market. The incumbent monopolist can react by increasing the costs of entry 
of his rivals in the complementary market. He will achieve this goal by tying the 
primary product with the complementary product. The entry of the alternative 
producer in the primary market at the second period will therefore be deterred. The 
objective of the strategy will not be to extend monopoly power in a secondary market 
but to preserve market power in the primary product. As a result, less innovation will 
happen in both the primary and complementary products markets.
The different models demonstrate that, in certain circumstances, IP rights 
holders will have the interest to deter dynamic innovation that could render obsolete 
their technological standard and therefore distort the dynamic innovation competition 
between technological standards.110
It is, however, clear that these anti-competitive effects can only be produced if 
the IP holder has a monopoly power in the market covered by the IP rights. This issue 
is of importance as the main objective of granting IP rights is to confer to the IP 
holder monopoly power. The aim pursued by competition law is nevertheless not to 
eliminate monopoly power but simply to constraint its use. The duties of the IP holder 
will therefore depend on the broad or wide definition of what constitutes a monopoly 
power.
3. The evolution of the “monopoly” concept and the use of the “property rights” 
rhetoric
The differences that exist between property rights and IP raise important 
doubts on the validity of the property rights approach in analyzing intellectual 
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property. The “property rights” rationale has nevertheless been one of the main 
engines of the expansion of the protection of intellectual property rights. The use of
the terminology of property rights is not fortuitous. It had the objective to understate 
the historic link between intellectual property (mainly patents) and monopolies. 
3.1. Intellectual property rights as monopolies
The history of patents highlights the fact that their conception as a form of 
“property right” is a recent evolution. Initially, patents were conceived of as 
monopoly privileges granted by the sovereign to supporters and favorites as a reward 
for their loyalty.111 The excesses of these unjustified grants of privilege led to an 
increasing unrest of the courts and the legislature, which sought to create boundaries 
for these exercises of “royal prerogative”.
In the case Darcy v Allein, in 1603, the common law of restraints to trade was 
used to deny Darcy, a Queen’s Elisabeth I favorite, the exclusive right to import and 
manufacture playing cards. Darcy was not the inventor of playing cards but this was 
not the only reason that the Court (Kings Bench) refused to grant the exclusive 
privilege. According to the Court, the Queen’s grant of a monopoly was invalid 
because such a restraint prevents persons who may be skilled in trade to exercise their 
activities, and therefore promotes “idleness”. The grant of an exclusive privilege 
damages everyone who wants to use the product because the monopolist will raise the 
price and reduce the quality of the goods sold. This rule was codified by the Statute of 
Monopolies in 1623, which declared void all monopolies but explicitly excepted from 
the prohibition, patents granted to the first inventor or inventors of new manufactures, 
“as also they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state, by raising prices 
of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient”.
The collision between the restraints of trade doctrine (an early common law 
antecedent of competition law) and what could be considered as the initial steps of 
patent law has been resolved in recognizing the limited circumstances in which patent 
monopoly grants could be upheld. It is interesting to note that the word “property” 
was not used and that intellectual property rights were referred to as “privileges”. 
Patents were also to be considered void any time they raised the price of commodities 
“at home”. Their creation was therefore purely motivated by mercantilist reasons 
(enhance technological progress and export trade) and their negative effects on prices 
strictly limited to foreign trade and consumers.
The use of the term “property” came later when it has become clear that there
should be some kind of natural rights justification for maintaining this kind of 
monopoly privilege in the period of laissez-faire that followed the mercantilist era. As 
Spence puts it:
“(t)o say that something is property is usually by presumption to legitimize 
control of its use by an individual owner. It is to require that any limitation of 
that control be justified […] The rhetorical power of the property topos is the 
implication that such control is a given: invoking the property topos challenges 
those who would derogate from the owner’s presumptive right of control to 
make their case”.112
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The evolution of the “monopoly” concept has nevertheless limited the risks of conflict 
between competition law and intellectual property and the need to use the “property 
rights” rhetoric.
3.2. The evolution of the “monopoly” concept
The use of the term “property” does not necessarily confer an absolute 
antitrust immunity.113 One of the attributes of property rights is exclusivity. 
Exclusivity means that the owner of the property has the right to exclude others from 
exercising her rights of use without permission.114 The right to exclude is also the 
cornerstone of the legal conception of “monopoly”, before the more economic 
concept of market power was finally accepted. Indeed, during the most active period 
of antitrust enforcement that started in United States in the1930s and also even earlier, 
the legal definition of what constituted “monopoly” was still predominant and 
diverged from the definition of this term by economists.115 This period also marks the 
ascendancy of the competition logic after a period of relative co-existence between 
intellectual property rights and antitrust.116
In a seminal study, in 1937, Edward Mason explained the dissimilarities 
between the legal and economic concept of monopoly power.117 According to Mason, 
lawyers and economists use the term of monopoly power with different meanings. For 
lawyers, monopoly power means restriction of the freedom to compete. For 
economists, it illustrates the control of the market. According to Mason,
“(t)he antithesis of the legal conception of monopoly is free competition, 
understood to be a situation in which the freedom of any individual or firm to 
engage in legitimate economic activity is not restrained by the state, by 
agreements between competitors or by the predatory practices of a rival. But 
free competition thus understood is quite compatible with the presence of 
monopoly elements in the economic sense of the word monopoly. For the 
antithesis of the economic conception of monopoly is not free  but pure 
competition, understood to be a situation in which no seller or buyer has any 
control over the price of his product. Restriction of competition is the legal 
content of monopoly; control of the market is its economic substance. And 
these realities are by no means equivalent.118”
The legal definition of market power emphasizes, on the contrary, restriction 
to trade and exclusion.
“It was not incumbent upon the courts to show that prices had actually been 
raised or quality of the product deteriorated in order to be able to hold that a 
monopoly existed contrary to the common law. Monopoly meant exclusion 
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from a certain trade by legal dispensation and no examination of control of the 
market was necessary to establish this fact”.119
The result of this definition of monopoly power was that the courts were finding 
illegal “every contract limiting competition among the contracting competitors 
regardless of the effect or probable effect of such a contract on control of the market 
[…] (and) without examination of the extent of its (firm’s) control of the market”.120
If monopoly is considered as a synonym for exclusive right, then by definition 
the owner of a patent is a monopolist. But if the meaning of monopoly is the condition 
that generates social loss, in economics this condition is only present “when the 
demand curve has a negative slope in the region at which output is occurring”.121 This 
is not always the case for intellectual property rights, as there may be substitute 
products or technologies, which are not covered by the property rights and could be 
used instead by the consumers.122 The owners of the intellectual property rights are 
therefore limited in their capacity to charge a monopoly price as they should also take 
into account the competitive pressures exercised by competing products or 
technologies. Terminology is therefore important.123 The term ”economic rents” is a 
more suitable terminology than the concept of “monopoly” because it highlights the 
fact that the patent holder benefits from a cost advantage that allows him to make 
more profits than his rivals but the patent does not confer him the possibility to 
restrict output and therefore exercise monopoly power.124
As competition law has moved both in the United States and in Europe 
towards a more economic approach, the presumption that an intellectual property right 
may confer monopoly power has been weakened and ultimately abandoned. The 
Court of Justice of the European Communities was quick to state in Deutsche 
Grammophon that the mere possession of intellectual property rights does not 
automatically amount to a dominant position.125 The Court of Justice examines 
instead the position of the firm in the relevant market and the ability of the IP holder 
to “impede the maintenance of effective competition over a considerable part of the 
relevant market, having regard in particular to the existence and position of any 
producers or distributors who may be marketing similar goods or goods which may be 
substituted for them”.126 In Magill, the Court of Justice confirmed that “so far as 
dominant position is concerned, it is to be remembered at the outset that mere 
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ownership of an intellectual property right cannot confer such a position.127.” 
Although there is not presumption that intellectual property rights confer market 
power, IP rights may however enforce the inference of a dominant position and are 
usually considered as one of the factors indicating the existence of a dominant 
position if the undertaking has also a high market share.128 The US Supreme Court 
has also made clear in Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink that patents do not 
necessarily confer market power on the patentee.129
One should note, however, that the evolution of the conception of intellectual 
property from monopoly power to a category of property right is far from establishing 
an antitrust immunity for intellectual property rights. On the contrary, it may create 
the risk that considered as a form of “physical property” the use of IP rights may be 
limited by specific antitrust doctrines developed at first for tangible property rights, 
such as the essential facilities doctrine.
4. Competition law and refusals to grant access to intellectual property: towards 
the recognition of the specific nature of intellectual property
The application of article 82 EC to unilateral refusals to license IP rights has 
been an important issue since the Court of Justice’s (ECJ) decisions in Volvo v Veng
and CICRA v. Renault.130 The Court held in these cases that the right of the proprietor 
of a protected design to prevent third parties from manufacturing and selling or 
importing without its consent, products incorporating the design does not constitute an 
abuse of a dominant position as this will deprive the IP holder of the substance of her
exclusive right. Nevertheless, the Court did not go as far as to create an irrebuttable 
presumption for IP rights. A refusal to license may constitute an abuse if the exercise 
of the IP right would involve, in the part of the undertaking, “certain abusive 
conduct”. The Court did not seem to develop a different test for unilateral refusals to 
license IP than the test that was generally applied to unilateral refusals to deal. In 
subsequent decisions, the Court extended the scope of article 82 EC to cover the 
acquisition by a dominant firm of an exclusive patent license of an alternative 
technology.131
The case law moved, however, progressively towards the adoption of a 
standard, which takes into consideration the specificity of intellectual property rights. 
The “new product” test, adopted by the ECJ and the “incentives to innovation
balance” test, developed by the European Commission illustrate the specificity of 
refusals to license IP rights compared to other refusals to deal. The Court of First 
Instance confirmed the specificity of intellectual property rights in its decision in 
Microsoft even though it adopted a different test from that suggested by the 
Commission in its decision.
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4.1. The “new product” rule
The Court of Justice adopted the “new product” rule in Magill where it held 
that the exercise of an exclusive right by the intellectual property owner may, in 
exceptional circumstances, involve abusive conduct.132 Exceptional circumstances
consist of the following: (i) access is indispensable, (ii) the refusal to license 
prevented the appearance of a new product for which there was potential consumer 
demand, (iii) there was no justification for such refusal, (iv) the refusal to license 
excluded all competition on the secondary market. The requirement that the refusal to 
license prevented the sale of a new kind of product for which there was unsatisfied 
demand indicates that the Court aimed to protect innovation on the market. In Magill 
the refusal to license had impeded the emergence of a new product, a composite TV 
guide, which the holders of the intellectual property right did not offer and for which 
there was a potential demand. The weak and questionable nature of the IP right that 
was involved in this case, a copyright protection granted on simple TV listings under
a “sweet of the brow” standard, may explain the position of the Court, in particular as 
access to these data was indispensable for the emergence of the new product. The 
decision was not also clear as to the cumulative or alternative character of these 
exceptional circumstances.
The Court of Justice re-affirmed in IMS/NDC Health that, except exceptional 
circumstances, a refusal to license IP rights cannot by itself constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position.133 The ECJ held that these exceptional circumstances are 
cumulative and exist when the refusal to license is unjustified, prevents the emergence 
of a new product for which there is a potential consumer demand and excludes “any” 
or “all” competition on a secondary market134. By requiring that the refusal to license 
should prevent the emergence of a new product, the Court implicitly acknowledged 
the distinction between intellectual property and physical property as this condition 
does not exist for a refusal to grant access to tangible property. The Court also 
explained that the new product rule limits the finding of abuse for a refusal to licence 
a copyright (and presumably any type of intellectual property right) “only where the 
undertaking which requested the licence does not intend to limit itself essentially to 
duplicating the goods or services already offered on the secondary market by the 
owner of the copyright, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered by 
the owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand”135.
The identification of two different but interconnected stages of production is 
therefore important, as it is only if the products or services are an indispensable input 
for this new product and there is an actual demand for them by the undertakings 
which seek to compete with the dominant firm in the downstream product market, that 
a refusal to licence may fall within the scope of article 82.136 This is not a different 
from leveraging cases involving property rights on tangibles.137 As certain authors 
have, however, observed,
“[…] in intellectual property cases […] leveraging itself does not constitute an 
abuse under Art. 82 EC. In addition, there has to be the prevention of a new 
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product, i.e. a product that the IP owner does not offer himself. This additional 
condition distinguishes IP cases from ‘normal’ property or ‘normal’ essential-
facilities cases”.138
The standard used by the Court was, however, ambivalent and gave rise to 
different interpretations.139 It is clear that it does not go as far as requiring that the 
new product constitutes a different relevant market, nor that the new product should 
be novel, according to intellectual property law standards. Christian Ahlborn, David 
Evans and Jorge Padilla interestingly suggested that the new product is one “that 
satisfies potential demand by meeting the needs of consumers in ways that existing 
products do not”, “bringing in at current prices consumers who were not satisfied 
before” and thus expanding the market “by a significant amount”.140 According to 
these authors, the burden of proof should be allocated to the party requesting the 
licence as it is that party that possess the relevant information and would have 
ultimately the means to prove that it satisfies the new product requirement.141 While 
this solution has the benefit of being clear and operational, it would create a risk of 
under-inclusion of anticompetitive practices that may put innovation at risk. 
Indeed, cumulative innovation may benefit the existing consumers with better 
quality products without necessarily expanding demand. Innovation also consists of 
new methods that lower production costs in existing products. The existence of more 
choice for existing consumers is also something that should be taken into account 
even it does not necessarily expand demand by a significant amount. By focusing on 
the sole level of output this definition of the “new product” rule does not take fully 
into account the implications of refusals to license IP rights to consumer welfare.
4.2. The balance of incentives to innovation test of the Commission in Microsoft
In my view, the standard used by the Commission in the Microsoft decision, 
one month earlier, provides a better starting point in order to achieve an effective 
protection of innovation and consumer welfare.142 The facts are well known. The 
Commission considered that Microsoft had infringed article 82 (b) of the EC Treaty 
by refusing to supply Sun Microsystems the necessary information enabling them to 
establish interoperability between their work group server operating systems and 
Microsoft’s PC operating system Windows. Microsoft has a dominant position on the 
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PC operating market and Windows is the de facto standard for interoperability in 
work group networks.143
Microsoft was ordered to disclose interoperability information in a reasonable, 
non-discriminatory and timeliness way.144 While the Commission did not contemplate 
compulsory disclosure of the source code of Windows and the disclosure measure 
only covered interface specifications145, it acknowledged that “it cannot be excluded 
that ordering Microsoft to disclose such specifications and allow such use of them by 
third parties restricts the exercise of Microsoft’s intellectual property rights.”146. 
The Commission’s decision was based on the leverage theory, which provides 
that the refusal to provide interface specifications will render Microsoft able to extend 
its market power from the client PC operating system market into the work group 
server operating system market.147 The Commission also referred to the fact that 
Microsoft’s refusal to supply information under Windows 2000 was an illegal 
disruption of previous levels of supply, under Windows NT, referring to the previous 
case law of the Court. Microsoft’s conduct was not just a refusal to supply but also 
involved as the Court mentioned in the Volvo and Renault cases “certain abusive 
conduct”. The Commission also took into consideration as an aggravating factor the 
fact that Microsoft had previously disclosed part of the corresponding interface 
specifications in order to gain a foothold in the work group server market for its 
product148. Once Microsoft managed to induce acceptance in the market for its 
product, the company changed its incentives and held back access to information 
relating to interoperability with the Windows environment.149
The dominant company has therefore used an open access approach, when this 
was necessary and gained acceptance for its own product in the market but after the 
attainment of this objective, it suddenly changed course and refused interoperability. 
Implicitly, the Commission considered that this is not a competition on the merits as 
Microsoft’s success was partly the consequence of value added to the network by its 
competitors that were led to believe that Microsoft would continue to provide 
interoperability. However, as Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley remark, “locking 
companies into existing business relationships seems particularly inappropriate in 
fast-changing markets” and may prevent intra-technology competition by other 
licensees.150 The decision to continue to supply an existing customer is an issue that 
should not come within the realms of competition law as it will have the result to lock 
in dominant firms with their existing customers, without them being able to terminate 
their business relation other than by relying on a possible objective justification151. 
However, the issue in this case was not a refusal to supply or to license a 
specific firm but a general pattern of conduct refusing interoperability. Even if the 
Commission’s reference to the case law on disruption of existing supplies may give 
the impression that there is no limiting principle for the duty to supply an existing 
customer, the Commission’s decision should be considered in the context of the need 
to maintain interoperability and should not be extended to refusals to license. 
European competition law seeks to protect the “competitive process” and it is 
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considered that a refusal of interoperability to a de facto industry standard could hurt 
the competitive process.
The Commission avoided any reference to the new product test because 
Microsoft’s conduct was not necessarily impeding the emergence of an identifiable 
new product. Microsoft’s conduct had nevertheless the effect to reduce the incentives 
of its competitors to innovate152 (and produce new products in the future) and 
therefore to limit consumer choice.153 Microsoft has put forward the same justification 
than in the US litigation: the need to protect its own incentives to innovate by 
preserving its intellectual property rights154. The Commission nevertheless affirmed 
that intellectual property rights “cannot as such constitute a self-evident objective 
justification for Microsoft’s refusal to supply”155, following the position of the Federal 
Circuit in the US Microsoft case.156 Innovation is an objective for both intellectual 
property and competition law.157. The Commission employed a balancing test and 
concluded that 
“[…] a detailed examination of the scope of the disclosure at stake leads to the 
conclusion that, on balance, the possible negative impact of an order to supply 
on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate is outweighed by its positive impact on 
the level of innovation of the whole industry (including Microsoft). As such 
the need to protect Microsoft’s incentives to innovate cannot constitute an 
objective justification that would offset the exceptional circumstances 
identified”158.
The balancing test is broader than the “new product” rule at two respects. 
First, the Commission takes into account the incentives of the competitors of the 
dominant firm to innovate in the future. This is not an issue considered in Magill and 
NDC Health where the question was about products which, absent the refusal to 
supply, have been sold or were to be offered in the market. The new product rule in 
Magill and NDC Health does not cover situations of potential emergence of a new 
product in the future.
Second, the Commission included in its analysis the incentives of Microsoft to 
innovate. In Magill and NDCHealth the Court only referred to the dominant firm’s 
competitors, which had the intention to enter the secondary market in order to offer a 
new product and were excluded by the dominant firm. However, in Microsoft, the 
Commission took also into account Microsoft’s incentives to innovate in comparing 
the situation where article 82 applies with the alternative situation where Microsoft’s 
anti-competitive behaviour remains unfettered159. According to the Commission, 
“Microsoft’s research and development efforts are […] spurred by the 
innovative steps its competitors take in the work group server operating 
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system market. Were such competitors to disappear, this would diminish 
Microsoft’s incentives to innovate”. 
Because of the nature of the market, Microsoft’s incentives to innovate were 
maintained, while those of its competitors were also preserved. The analysis of the 
incentives of the dominant firm’s rivals as well as the dominant firm’s incentives to 
innovate extends the scope of article 82 in comparison with the “new product rule”, 
interpreted as involving the emergence of an identifiable “new” product or of an 
identifiable increase of output. It is based on the assumption that the competitive 
pressure increases the dominant firm’s incentives to innovate. This is also linked to 
the belief that a competitive market is the optimal structure for innovation. 
Surprisingly, while the Commission focused its analysis on innovation incentives, it 
also affirmed that “intellectual property rights are not in a different category to 
property rights as such”160. The case law of the Court on physical property rights does 
not, however, adopt the new product rule or include any dynamic efficiency 
consideration in balancing property rights with competition policy concerns. 
4.3 The Discussion Paper on article 82 EC
The recent discussion paper of DG Competition’s staff on the application of 
Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses also provides useful information on 
the assessment of a refusal to licence intellectual property rights161. According to the 
Commission’s staff, the enforcement of competition law should take into account 
“both the effect of having more short-run competition and the possible long-run 
effects on investment incentives”162. The discussion paper examines three situations 
of refusal to supply, without however, excluding that there might be others: the 
termination of an existing supply relationship, the situation where one or more 
companies are refusing to start supplying an input (including where the input is 
covered by intellectual property rights) and where this input consists of information 
necessary for interoperability.
The discussion paper distinguishes between first and second refusals to supply. 
An existing supply relationship creates a “rebuttable presumption that continuing 
these relationships is pro-competitive”163. This presumption may have far-reaching 
consequences for the possibility of a dominant undertaking to choose its own business 
partners or to extend its own activities. The Commission’s staff paper does not 
distinguish between intellectual property rights and other property rights. A decision 
to terminate or renew a licence of IP rights previously granted may also fall within 
this presumption. The plaintiff or the Commission should prove that the dominant 
firm’s behaviour in reality amounts to a termination, which is likely to have a 
negative effect on competition in the downstream market. The burden of proof then 
shifts to the defendant who has the difficult task to claim objective justifications and 
efficiencies as a possible defence of its conduct. For example, the dominant 
undertaking could argue that the undertaking terminated was not able to provide the 
appropriate commercial assurances or that it wants to integrate downstream and that 
the consumers are better off with a vertical integrated dominant firm than with the 
terminated supply relationship. 
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The discussion paper suggests a more lenient approach for first refusals to 
supply an input. The conditions are stricter for the plaintiff or the Commission than 
for the defendant as the plaintiff has to prove that the refusal to supply an 
indispensable input is likely to have a distorting foreclosure effect. The input may be 
an intellectual property right and it is sufficient that a captive, potential or 
hypothetical market is identified. According to the Commission, “such is the case 
where there is actual demand for the input on the part of undertakings seeking to carry 
out the activity for which the input is indispensable”164. The burden of proof then 
shifts to the dominant undertaking, which can claim, as a possible defence, objective 
justifications and efficiencies.
Adopting an ex ante perspective the Discussion paper insists on the need to 
consider if the investments that led to the existence of the indispensable input would 
have been made “even if the investor had known that it would have a duty to 
supply”165. The importance of the investments made (especially for the grant of IP 
rights) is also an element to consider: if they have not been particularly significant, “it 
may be likely that the investment would have been made even knowing that a duty to 
supply would be imposed”166. 
The Discussion Paper provides an additional condition for unilateral refusals 
to license IP rights. It is only under exceptional circumstances that the refusal to 
licence may constitute an infringement of article 82 CE. According to the 
Commission, the refusal to grant licence should prevent 
“the development of the market for which the licence is an indispensable 
input, to the detriment of consumers. This may only be the case if the 
undertaking which requests the licence does not intend to limit itself 
essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on this market 
by the owner of the IPR, but intends to produce new goods or services not 
offered by the owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer 
demand”167.
The Commission restates the new product condition and confirms the distinction 
made between IP rights and other property rights.
This becomes more obvious as the Discussion Paper proposes a second test, 
not exactly similar to that adopted by the Commission in the Microsoft case:
“a refusal to licence an IPR protected technology which is indispensable as a 
basis for follow-up innovation by competitors may be abusive even if the 
licence is not sought to directly incorporate the technology in clearly 
identifiable new goods and services. The refusal of licensing an IPR protected 
technology should not impair consumers’ ability to benefit from innovation 
brought about by the dominant undertaking’s competitors”168.
This test may have the effect to extend the scope of article 82 compared with 
the test applied by the Commission in Microsoft, as it takes only into account the 
reduction of the incentives to innovate of the dominant firm’s rivals and does not 
consider the dominant firm’s incentives to innovate: it is not therefore a balancing 
test.
The difficult implementation of the Microsoft’s decision balancing test may 
have been the reason to turn towards this more open-ended test. The courts are 
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generally ill equipped to conduct the type of prospective cost-benefit analysis that 
would be necessary in order to balance the incentives of the dominant firm and its 
rivals to innovate. In that respect, Microsoft was an easy case. The Commission did 
not undertake the difficult task to balance incentives to innovate, as the incentives of 
Microsoft were not hampered by the prohibition of the refusal to supply 
interoperability. However, if the dominant firm’s incentives to innovate were affected 
by the prohibition of the refusal to licence, it would be necessary to conduct a proper 
cost-benefit analysis, which may prove a difficult task for the judiciary.
The Discussion paper identifies refusals to supply information for 
interoperability (the situation that arose in the Microsoft decision) as a specific case of 
refusals to supply. A refusal to supply interoperability should not be treated the same 
than a simple refusal to supply or to licence. Although the discussion paper considers 
that there is no general obligation, even for dominant companies, to ensure 
interoperability and therefore that there is no need to create a rebuttable presumption, 
it also states that “leveraging market power from one market to another by refusing 
interoperability information may be an abuse of a dominant position”169. The 
necessary elements to be considered are the conditions that normally apply to refusals 
to supply a new customer and the existence of a leveraging effect. These conditions 
do not apply if the refusal to provide interoperability involves IP rights. This 
conclusion stems from the discussion paper’s statement that it may not be appropriate 
to apply to refusals to supply information on trade secrets “the same high standards 
for intervention as those described in the previous subsection” (on intellectual 
property rights)170.
4.4. The CFI’s position in Microsoft
The CFI confirmed the Commission’s Microsoft decision in 2007171. While it 
reaffirmed the four criteria of the ECJ in Magill and NDC Health it also adopted a 
more open ended interpretation for some of these conditions. 
The Court’s control is limited to judicial review, which means that the 
Community Courts cannot substitute their own assessment of fact for the 
Commission’s.172 The Commission also benefits from an important margin of
appreciation in complex economic and technical appraisals. The Court’s role is 
limited to “establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable 
and consistent”, “whether that evidence contains all the relevant data that must be 
taken into consideration in appraising a complex situation and whether it is capable of 
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it”.173
Microsoft argued that if the case were to be appraised in the light of the 
conditions of Magill and IMS Health, there would be no abuse, as none of the four 
circumstances was present in this case and the same was true for the Bronner criteria 
none of which was satisfied. In addition, the Commission’s decision imposed a higher 
degree of interoperability than what was required by the Council Directive 
91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs174, the essence of 
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Microsoft’s argument being that the degree of interoperability required by the 
Commission could only be achieved if it allowed its rivals “to clone or to reproduce 
its products”.175 Finally, the communication protocols that Microsoft had to share 
with undertakings that had an interest in developing and distributing work group 
server operating system products, were covered by intellectual property rights 
(patents, copyright as well as trade secrets) and were technologically innovative. 
Microsoft emphasized its important efforts to develop these protocols, in particular 
the “large number of engineers” and the “significant financial resources” used for 
their development and improvement. The Commission opposed the argument that the
communication protocols were neither new nor a valuable invention and in any case 
they should enjoy a more limited protection than patents and copyright, as they were 
not intellectual property rights.176
The Court noted that the Commission had used in this case the “stricter legal 
test” of refusals to license intellectual property rights.177 It also observed that trade 
secrets should be treated as equivalent in this case “to intellectual property rights”, 
without, however, excluding the possibility that in other circumstances different rules 
could apply to them.178 The main issue to examine was therefore the non-application 
by the Commission of the strict conditions of the Magill, IMS and Oscar Bronner 
judgments, and in particular the new product rule. 
The Commission relied on three specific characteristics of the case to support 
its interpretation of the conditions of IMS: the fact that this was an interoperability 
case, the “extraordinary power” of Microsoft to eliminate competition on the adjacent 
work group server operating systems market and finally that the conduct in question 
involved disruption of previous levels of supply.179 The Court reaffirmed the
cumulative character of the three exceptional circumstances of IMS:
“[…] the following circumstances, in particular, must be considered to be 
exceptional:
- in the first place, the refusal relates to a product or service indispensable to 
the existence of a particular activity on a neighbouring market;
- in the second place, the refusal is of such a kind as to exclude any effective 
competition on the neighbouring market
- in the third place, the refusal prevents the appearance of a new product for 
which there is potential consumer demand”.180
It also used language that implied that these were not the only exceptional 
circumstances in which the exercise of the exclusive right by the owner of the 
intellectual property rights may give rise to such an abuse181, although it noted that the 
requirement “that the refusal prevents the appearance of a new product for which 
there is consumer demand is found only in the case-law on the exercise of an 
intellectual property right”.182 Intellectual property rights are therefore subject to a 
stricter competition law regime than property rights on tangibles as article 82 EC will 
apply in circumstances where cumulative innovation or technical development would 
likely be affected.
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The Court examined the facts of the case in order to establish the existence of 
these exceptional circumstances. Following the approach of the ECJ in IMS, the Court 
adopted a broad reading of the condition of indispensability as it found sufficient that 
“two different stages of production were identified and that they were interconnected 
in that the upstream product was indispensable for supply of the downstream 
product”.183
In addition, he CFI proceeded to a broad interpretation of the criterion of 
elimination of competition. It rejected Microsoft’s argument that the Commission had 
to demonstrate that there was a high probability that the refusal to license an 
intellectual property right to a third party would eliminate all competition in the work 
group server operating systems market. According to the Court, it is not necessary to 
demonstrate that all competition on the market will be eliminated:
“(w)hat matters, for the purposes of establishing an infringement of Article 82 
EC, is that the refusal at issue is liable to, or is likely to, eliminate all effective
competition on the market. It must be made clear that the fact that the 
competitors of the dominant undertaking retain a marginal presence in certain 
niches on the market cannot suffice to substantiate the existence of such 
competition”.184
Indeed, the application of the leverage theory by the CFI does not require the 
existence of a dominant position, or the likelihood of the emergence of a dominant 
position of the undertaking on the secondary market.185 The Court emphasized the 
rapid and significant growth of Microsoft’s market shares and the marginalisation of 
its competitors’ products and market position, which constitute much lower thresholds 
for antitrust intervention than the existence of a dominant position. The position of the 
Court may have been influenced by the significant network effects on this market, 
which would have made irreversible any tipping of the market to the benefit of 
Microsoft.
Remarkably, the CFI gave also a broad interpretation of the “new product 
rule” in comparison to the previous case law. The Commission had adopted its 
decision a month before the NDC Health judgment of the ECJ and it did not rely on 
the “new product” rule which was confirmed in this judgment as one of the conditions 
for the application of Article 82 to unilateral refusals to license. This approach was
confirmed by the CFI:
“(t)he circumstance relating to the appearance of a new product as envisaged 
in Magill and IMS Health […] cannot be the only parameter which determines 
whether a refusal to license an intellectual property right is capable of causing 
prejudice to consumers within the meaning of Article 82(b). As the provision 
states, such prejudice may arise where there is a limitation not only of 
production or markets, but also of technical development”.186
The focus on the limitation of technical development to the detriment of 
consumers widens the scope of application of Article 82 EC in comparison to the
interpretation of the new product rule of Magill and IMS. The Court does not develop 
specific criteria in order to assess the effect of the practice on technical development. 
It rather assumes that this would be the case, based on the finding that non-Microsoft 
work group server operating systems were better than Windows work group server 
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systems,187 and on the assumption that Microsoft’s competitors will have enough
incentives to innovate as it will be in their interest to differentiate their products with 
respect to parameters which consumers consider important.188 Contrary to Magill and 
IMS, Microsoft’s conduct did not impede the emergence of identifiable new products 
but affected the competitive process that would have brought about these new 
products in the future. The Court’s emphasis on preserving the competitive process, 
considered as indispensable in order to maintain the ability of rivals to innovate is not 
very different from that followed by the Commission in the context of innovation 
markets under Article 81 EC.189
The test is also broader than the Commission’s balancing to innovation test in 
the Microsoft decision. It is reminded that the Commission employed a balancing test
and compared the incentives of innovation of Microsoft’s competitor’s with those of 
Microsoft. The CFI did not embrace the balancing test and explicitly excluded from 
the analysis under the new product rule the consideration of the effect of the specific 
conduct on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate. This is an issue which the Court
examines only under the circumstances relating to the absence of objective 
justification, which is the last step of the competition assessment:
“The Court notes […] that although the burden of proof of the existence of the 
circumstances that constitute an infringement of Article 82 EC is borne by the 
Commission, it is for the dominant undertaking concerned, and not for the 
Commission, before the end of the administrative procedure, to raise any plea 
of objective justification and to support it with arguments and evidence. It then 
falls to the Commission, where it proposes to make a finding of an abuse of a 
dominant position, to show that the arguments and evidence relied on by the 
undertaking cannot prevail and, accordingly, that the justification put forward 
cannot be accepted”.190
It follows that the dominant firm will bear the “initial burden of proof” to establish 
that if it were required to disclose the interoperability information that would have 
significant negative impact on its incentives to innovate.191 The onus of proof will, 
however, shift to the Commission, if the dominant company is successful in providing 
objective justifications. Infringement of intellectual property rights is not sufficient to 
constitute an objective justification, as this will be inconsistent “with the raison 
d’être” of the exception which is recognized “in favour of free competition”, if the 
plaintiff establishes the existence of the exceptional circumstances of Magill and 
IMS.192
The Court did not accept to balance Microsoft’s incentives to innovate with 
those of its competitors and exercised a limited control on the Commission’s counter-
arguments that Microsoft’s products would not have been cloned as a result of 
interoperability, that the interoperability was widespread in the industry concerned, 
that Microsoft’s commitment was not different from previous case law and that it was 
compatible with Directive 91/250.193  It did not however adequately respond to the 
main thrust of Microsoft’s argument: that its incentives to innovate would be affected 
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by the duty to provide full interoperability. One cannot seriously claim that incentives 
to innovate are affected only in circumstances when the competitors are able to clone 
the dominant firm’s products. One may interpret the Court’s decision as indicating 
that a dominant firm cannot argue that the duty to license will affect its incentives to 
innovate if they had initially followed an open access policy in order to establish their 
products in an existing market and then refused interoperability when they foresaw 
the opportunity that the market could tip in their favour. The Court might have arrived 
to a different conclusion, had Microsoft been the first to innovate in this market. The 
interpretation of the new product rule of the CFI may lead to an extension of Article 
82 EC, as it takes into account only the incentives of the rivals of the dominant firm to 
innovate without considering those of the dominant firm. Nevertheless, it is always 
the case that a refusal to license would make it more difficult for competitors to 
innovate as it has generally the effect to place them at a disadvantage by comparison 
to the dominant firm.
The only limiting principle to an overbroad interpretation of this test would be 
the requirement that the disadvantage to rivals that is produced by the refusal to 
license causes consumer harm. Indeed, Article 82(b) EC sanctions abuses consisting 
in “limiting production, markets or technical development to the detriment of 
consumers”. However, the interpretation of the consumer detriment requirement by 
the Court is ambiguous. Certainly, the Court notes that consumer choice would be 
affected if rival products of equal or better quality would not be able to compete on 
equal terms at the market.194 In other parts of the decision the Court seems, however, 
to interpret this condition as requiring only the preservation of market access of 
competitors without requiring that the plaintiff brings evidence that the products that 
could be excluded from the market are or would likely be better quality products than 
those of the dominant firm. The existence of consumer choice seems to be equated to 
the preservation of competitive rivalry on the market:
“[…] it is settled law that Article 82 EC covers not only practices which may 
prejudice consumers directly but also those which indirectly prejudice them by 
impairing an effective competitive structure. […] In this case, Microsoft 
impaired the effective competitive structure on the work group server 
operating systems market by acquiring a significant market share on that 
market”.195
This illustrates the risk of an overbroad interpretation of the consumer detriment 
requirement in Article 82 EC following the CFI’s decision.
4.5. Concluding remarks: the need to apply an overall “decision theory” framework
It should be clear by now that the case law has developed multiple standards in 
order to tackle the anti-competitive exercise of intellectual property rights. Despite the 
use of the ‘property rights’ rhetoric, the competition law authorities and the courts do 
not apply the essential facilities doctrine and take into account the need to protect 
innovation. The standards used are nevertheless complex and fact-specific, and 
ultimately a source of uncertainty for firms. The need for an overall approach is 
highlighted by Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla, who suggest an ‘error-cost framework’, 
which is structured in two stages. First, economic theory and evidence will be used 
“to assess the cost and likelihood of errors resulting from condemning welfare-
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increasing business practices or condoning welfare reducing ones”; in a second stage, 
“a legal rule that minimizes the expected cost of intervention taking into account the 
possibility of legal error” will be “selected from a spectrum of standards ranging from 
per se legality to per se illegality, including the rule of reason”.196 The authors start 
from the assumption that “what matters is the impact of forcing access on the 
incentives to innovate, and not the nature of the property rights at stake”.197 What 
applies to intellectual property rights should also apply to other property rights as both 
are “the result of previous investment or risk taking”198.
This starting position may be criticized as it is not always true that intellectual 
property rights are the result of important investment or risk taking. In addition, this 
approach does not take into account the different degrees of previous investment and 
risk taking. An insignificant inventive effort will be considered the same way a 
significant one would be. The authors’ assumption may be explained by the fact that 
they try to avoid the difficulties of balancing incentives to innovate with 
anticompetitive effects, which, they consider, is “an extremely complex” and 
“daunting task” for courts199. However, no valid reason exists in adopting such a 
strong assumption. If courts are considered able to conduct a rather complex 
balancing approach and take into account dynamic efficiencies in implementing 
article 81§3 EC, there is no reason why they are not able to exercise the same kind of 
analysis in implementing article 82 EC.
Based on their first assumption, the authors advocate that “the optimal legal 
standard for the antitrust assessment of refusals to license IP by dominant companies 
takes the form of a modified per se legality rule, where compulsory licensing is 
required only in exceptional circumstances”200. This is the case only when 
compulsory licensing is “most likely to result in a long-run welfare increase”201. 
However, the standard proposed is, in reality, a per se legality one as the authors add 
that “there is no practical way to restrict compulsory licensing to those situations in 
which it would necessarily improve consumer welfare in the long run”202. This 
conclusion stems from another assumption that may also be criticized. According to 
Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla, the existence of compulsory licensing will inevitably 
reduce the incentive ex ante for the IP holder to take the risk to invest in new 
products203. However, this hypothesis does not always hold. The increasing 
competition in the secondary market will exercise pressure on the IP holder to 
innovate as this will be the only way to maintain its competitive advantage against its 
competitors. The disincentive created by the compulsory license may well exist but it 
is also important to consider that the IP holder will still have a first mover advantage 
as it would probably not be before a substantial period of time that her rivals would be 
able to compete in equal terms. 
Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla apply the “cost-error framework” to antitrust but 
not to intellectual property rights, which, they consider, is the outcome of a 
meritorious investment and risk taking. However, this double standard is not 
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justifiable. Ironically, this approach assumes that decision analysis theory may be 
useful for assessing antitrust, which is essentially a judge-made law that follows an 
adversarial process204 but not for examining intellectual property rights, which are 
granted by a regulatory body and therefore it is more likely that they are subject to 
decision errors. Indeed, the protection of IP has expanded considerably the last twenty 
years following the transformation of economic structures and the focus on 
competitiveness205. Even trivial inventions may benefit from an IP protection. Type I 
errors (over-expansion of IP rights) are therefore more likely to happen than type II 
errors (under-inclusiveness of IP protection).
The protection of intellectual property is backwards looking. The examination 
of the patent application focuses on the prior art and there is no assessment of the 
existence of possible substitutes or potential competition. The problem is particularly 
acute in emerging industries where prior art is difficult to locate as it is disseminated 
in scientific journals or in the form of informal know how, with the result that the 
patent officer’s examination can be easily flawed.206 By limiting the negative effects 
of type I errors, caused by a broad intellectual property protection, competition law is 
a necessary complement to intellectual property law.
In conclusion, competition law’s intervention is justified if IP law has failed to 
guarantee the level of innovation in the market. This is what happened in Magill. 
Intellectual property rights were granted to simple data without any inventive effort 
been made. The European Community’s Directive on the Legal Protection of 
databases, which provides high levels of protection for databases may also illustrate 
the side-effects of a careless intellectual property protection towards the need to 
protect competition in the markets207. The directive was adopted following an intense 
effort of lobbying by database companies and is a compromise between the lower 
“sweat of the brow” copyright protection that was granted to databases in some 
European countries (UK, Ireland) and the higher standard of copyright protection 
granted by other Member States (France). The directive established a legal framework 
giving a high level of copyright protection to “original” databases, which “by reason 
of the selection or arrangement of their contents constitute the author’s own 
intellectual creation”208 and a new form of “sui generis” protection to non-original 
databases if the “maker” of the database showed “that there has been qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or 
presentation of the contents” of the database.209
The Directive protects a simple compilation of existing basic information, 
which is the result of some kind of investment. The objective of this form of IP 
protection is therefore not to protect innovation but to protect the database “makers” 
investments against the “parasitic behaviour” of free riders210. The “sui generis” 
protection granted has the potential to produce important anticompetitive effects. 
Contrary to a copyright protection, which distinguishes between the idea, which stays 
in the public domain, and the expression of the idea, which is protected, the database 
directive gives the possibility to exclude the re-utilization of the data by others. This 
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is particularly risky for competition, “in cases, where a database is the only possible 
source of the data contained therein, such as telephone directories, television program 
listings or schedules of sporting events” and may result in “an absolute downstream 
information monopoly in derivative information products and services”211.
In response to this risk, article 16 of the Directive required from the
Commission to submit a report examining whether the application of the sui generis 
right “has led to abuse of a dominant position or other interference with free 
competition which would justify appropriate measures being taken, including the 
establishment of non-voluntary licensing arrangements”. Indeed, while the first 
proposal of the Database Directive provided for the possibility of compulsory 
licensing in order to limit the risk of anti-competitive effects, these provisions were 
removed from its final version, which limited the right of the database “maker” only
in exceptional circumstances212. This is probably why recital 47 of the Directive 
provides that this Directive is without prejudice to the application of Community or 
national competition rules, making therefore possible the limitation by competition 
law of the rights of the database “makers”. The application of competition law can 
therefore be seen to be triggered by the failure of the text of the database Directive to 
take properly into account the protection of cumulative innovation and competition.
The national courts and the European Court of Justice have interpreted the 
“quantitative substantial investment” requirement of the Directive restrictively in 
order to avoid the emergence of anticompetitive effects213. Indeed, the ECJ curtailed 
the scope of the protection by explicitly refusing to adopt the “spin of” doctrine, 
developed by some Dutch courts, which would make possible to provide sui generis
protection for databases generated as “by-products” of the main activities of the 
Database “maker” on which the later has a de facto monopoly (e.g. television program 
listings, railway schedules etc), which is the situation that arose in Magill214. The ECJ 
distinguished between creating and obtaining data in order to assemble the contents of 
a database215. It also considered that the activity of creating materials that make up the 
content of a database did not constitute substantial investment in the sense of the 
directive and that therefore a single-source database was not protected under the sui 
generis rights216.
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By adopting a narrow interpretation of the scope of the Directive the Court 
avoided that single-source databases would benefit from the sui generis protection 
and as a result enable the database “makers” to abuse their dominant position on the 
information they create. The recent evaluation report of the Database directive also 
considers the risk of potential anticompetitive effects and examines different options, 
ranging from the simple repeal of the Directive to the preservation of the status-quo. 
While the Commission notes the “attachment” of the EU database industry to the sui 
generis protection for factual compilations and their “considerable resistance” to any 
reform (an indication of the “specific-interest group” character of this legislation), it 
also remarks the weak empirical support for such system of protection.217 It is 
interesting to note that the United States have opted for a system of liability and not of 
property rights in protecting the investments of the database “makers”.218 The US 
approach is based on unfair competition principles which protect the database 
“maker” against misappropriation only if, as a result, there will be market harm.219
The limitation of the scope of intellectual property protection makes possible 
the consideration ex ante (before the grant of the IP right) of the effects of IP rights on 
competition and constitutes therefore a conceivable option for attaining the right 
balance between competition law and intellectual property.220
The European Commission’s recent proposal to amend Directive 98/71/EC on 
the legal protection of designs illustrates the dialectic relationship between the scope 
of IP rights and competition law.221 By removing Members States’ option to provide 
design protection for spare parts of complex products, such as motor vehicles, the 
Commission seeks to avoid the constitution of monopolies in the aftermarket for spare 
parts for which “there is no practical alternative”.222 The proposal codifies the case 
law of the ECJ in Renault and Volvo,223 whose effect could have been curtailed by the 
generalisation of the ‘new product rule’ to all refusals to license IP rights, following 
the ECJ’s judgment in IMS/NDC some months earlier.224
However, limitation of the scope of the IP rights is not always easy to achieve, 
especially because this will necessitate the harmonisation of national intellectual 
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property laws and the emergence of a unified intellectual property enforcement 
system. A more viable option would be to “internalize” competition law concerns 
within intellectual property by developing “built-in balancing factors in intellectual 
property laws”.225
5.  The integration of competition law concerns in intellectual property law
Intellectual property has developed its own mechanisms in order to set limits 
on abusive patent exploitation of intellectual property rights. I will examine the issue 
of patents as these are the stronger IP rights in the sense that they give the possibility 
to the IP owner to exclude others from the use of the IP right. Copyright law only 
protects from copying (duplication, adaptation, distribution and public performance) 
and is subject to important exceptions and defences, such as the fair use doctrine. 
“Inadvertent” re-creation of the copyright work is also not actionable. “Inadvertent” 
infringements of patents are, on the contrary, actionable.226 More generally, patents 
involve a stronger exclusionary right, while copyright may be conceptualized as a 
governance regime.227
Different instruments restrict the patentee’s rights once they have been 
granted.228 According to the exhaustion doctrine, the rights of the patent holder are 
“exhausted” after first sale by the right-owner or his consent therefore limiting the 
rights of the patentee. However, this doctrine relates to the free circulation of the 
goods embodying the patent right and does not solve the main issue covered by this 
paper, the possibility of the patent-holder to block cumulative innovation.
5.1. The reverse doctrine of equivalents
The reverse doctrine of equivalents in US patent law is another option to 
protect cumulative innovation and prevent unwarranted extension of the patent claims 
beyond a fair scope of the patentee’s invention.229 This doctrine is an instrument to 
accommodate two conflicting sets of property rights: the property right of the initial 
inventor with the property right of an improver. A cumulative innovator may own an 
improvement patent, which renders impossible for the subsequent innovators to use 
their improvements without infringing the pioneer’s patent. The initial inventor 
cannot also use the improvement without infringing the subservient innovator’s 
patent, which leads to a situation of blocking patents. The reverse doctrine of 
equivalents comes into play when the subservient innovation adds a considerably 
important value to the pioneer invention offering to the initial innovator the possibility 
to extract the most important part of the value created by the cumulative innovation 
(and avoid hold-up situations).230 As Merges and Duffy explain “the reverse doctrine 
of equivalents solves the problem, by in effect excusing the improver from 
infringement liability – and therefore removing the original patentee’s hold up 
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right”.231 The doctrine offers a useful alternative to the absence of a formal possibility 
of compulsory licensing under US patent law. 
5.2. Compulsory licensing
The possibility of compulsory licensing renders unnecessary such a doctrine in 
Europe. Indeed, according to Section 49 of the Patents Act 1977, once a British patent 
has been granted, the Comptroller has the power to grant a compulsory licence for a 
number of grounds, depending on the fact that the patentee is established in a country 
that is a member of the WTO agreement. Indeed, article 31 of the TRIPS agreement 
limits the number of grounds on which compulsory licensing can be based. One of the 
grounds is that “because of unreasonable restrictions on licensing the patent, 
exploitation of another patented invention, which is technically and economically
important as being prevented or hindered, or commercial or industrial activities in the 
UK are being unfairly prejudiced”.232 The Comptroller has the discretion to grant 
compulsory licensing and will usually balance a variety of considerations, such as the 
nature of the invention, “the time that has elapsed since grant” or “the ability of the 
applicant to work it to the public advantage and the risks to him”.233 However, the 
high costs of compulsory licensing234 and its disincentive effect to invest in R&D, 
may explain why this instrument is only used in rare occasions.
Both the reverse doctrine of equivalents and compulsory licensing provide 
limitations to the exercise of the exclusive right by the IP holder with the aim to 
protect cumulative innovation. Nevertheless, these restrictions do not cover pure 
competition law concerns, such as the leveraging of the monopoly power granted by 
the exclusive right to an adjacent market or the strategic use of the IP right in order to 
increase rivals’ costs to the detriment of consumers. These are doctrines of IP law and 
cannot adequately address the interface between competition law and intellectual 
property. The patent misuse doctrine addresses these specific concerns.
5.3. Patent misuse doctrine
The patent misuse doctrine constitutes an affirmative defence to an action for 
patent infringement, the counterclaimant defendant arguing that the patentee improper 
attempts to extend the scope of the patent or violates the antitrust laws.235 The 
doctrine was created in order to avoid the leveraging by the patent holders of their 
monopoly power from the patented good market to another market that was 
previously anticompetitive. This mainly covered two practices: tying practices “that 
conditioned a patent license on the purchase of an unpatented product” and 
“assertions by patentees that a sale of an unpatented good constituted contributory 
infringement”.236
The doctrine first appeared after the failure of early case law to restrict the 
patent holders conduct relying solely on the antitrust laws.237 The courts employed a 
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property right rhetoric and refused to accept antitrust based defences to patent 
infringement claims. However, based on equity grounds, the Supreme Court refused 
in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co to enforce a patent because the patent holder 
was making use of its “patent monopoly” (sic) to restrain competition in the 
marketing of unpatented articles for use with the patented machines, thus extending 
its “monopoly” to a market uncovered by his or her patent right.238 The doctrine was 
later extended to a number of commercial practices such as tying, minimum resale 
price maintenance and non-competition clauses but does not cover unilateral refusals 
to deal.239 The 1952 Patent Act was amended in 1988 in order to overrule Morton Salt
by eliminating the per se ban on patent tying when the patent holder does not dispose 
of market power. Subsequent case law linked the analysis of tying arrangements in the 
context of patent misuse with antitrust law standards.240
The evolution of the patent misuse doctrine towards antitrust law standards is 
a good example of the dialectical relation that should exist between these two 
disciplines, but also highlights the comparative advantage of the highly sophisticated 
in economic learning and evolving antitrust law standard in assessing the anti-
competitive effects of business practices. The original IP doctrine of patent misuse 
was in fact a creation of the Supreme Court and as long as its foundations were in 
harmony with the activist antitrust enforcement of the 1950s and 1960s, the doctrine 
expanded. However, once the new economic learning of the Chicago school put into 
question the leverage theory on which the patent misuse doctrine was largely based, 
the later entered a long period of agony and gradually lost its autonomy to the 
antitrust concepts. By introducing a market power requirement, the reform of 1988 
marked a turning point but was finally ineffective in maintaining the autonomy of the 
doctrine. Indeed, at the end, the courts turned to the familiar antitrust standards. 
While having distinctive characteristics than the US patent misuse doctrine, 
the evolution of the misuse rule in Britain is not different. Established by the UK 
Patents Act of 1907 and recently embodied in Section 44 of the UK Patents Act of 
1977, the misuse doctrine was restrictively construed by the courts and essentially 
covered tying arrangements. Article 44 was finally repealed by section 70 of the 
Competition Act in 1998 in order to render British legislation compatible with EC 
competition law, which exempted certain tying arrangements from the application of 
article 81 of the EC Treaty.241
The proposals of the FTC Report to integrate competition concerns in patent 
law constitute also another illustration of the effort of IP law to conform to antitrust 
standards. The FTC report made several proposals as to the necessary reform of the 
patent system. Two of them are of particular interest for this study: the possibility for 
the Patent Office to “consider possible harm to competition along with other possible 
benefits and costs, before extending the scope of patentable subject matter” and the 
necessity to “expand consideration of economic learning and competition policy 
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concerns in patent law decision-making by increasing communications between the 
PTO and the antitrust agencies”242. These recommendations insist on the importance 
of trans-disciplinary links between IP and competition law243 and illustrate the fact 
that intellectual property and competition law are in the process of becoming a unified 
field.244 The Antitrust Modernization Commission, a bipartisan Commission put in 
place in order to reflect on the reform of US antitrust law, has also suggested that 
Congress “should seriously consider” the recommendations of the FTC Report and 
that “the courts and the Patent and Trademark Office should avoid an overly lax 
application of the obviousness standard that allows patents on obvious subject matter 
and thus harms competition and innovation”.245
The rhetoric of “property rights” may artificially impede that trend. 
Propertarianism (and the possible slippery slope towards the concept of subjective 
rights) may render difficult the infusion into intellectual property of a degree of 
instrumentalism.246 An instrumental approach presents the advantage that it avoids the 
caveat of considering IP rights as monopolies or as Drahos puts it “monopoly 
privileges”.247  The terminology of “monopoly privileges” does not avoid the pitfall of 
considering that an exclusive right is automatically a monopoly. Drahos uses the term 
“monopoly” because it has a negative connotation and therefore it could give more 
strength to his argument on the necessity to impose duties on the holders of IP rights. 
The term privilege also is used for the same reason. 
Nevertheless, Drahos’ definition of IP rights as “monopoly privileges”, which 
give rise to corresponding duties does not avoid an internal inconsistency: how is it 
possible to argue that something is still a “privilege” if at the same time it generates 
duties? When does a privilege increasingly burdened with duties stop being a 
privilege? Drahos’ definition also links the existence of duties to the idea of 
monopoly privilege and assumes that these are constant. If one person benefits from 
the same privilege than another one, both of them should be burdened with the same 
duties. However, this is not always true. The duties imposed on patent holders vary. A 
patent holder without a dominant position on the relevant market does not incur the 
same duties as a patent holder who does benefit from a dominant position and decides 
to adopt a tying practice. The nature of the “monopoly privilege” of both patent 
holders is nevertheless the same. It seems therefore necessary to search for another 
concept, which will be flexible enough to take into account the different situations. 
The concept of regulation avoids the negative connotation of the term monopoly 
privilege” and is flexible enough to facilitate the interaction between IP and 
competition law. The next section will explore the idea of IP as a form of regulation 
and its implications on the IP-competition law interface.
6. IP as a form of regulation
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There is not need to develop a grand theory on the perfect equilibrium 
between intellectual property and antitrust. This is a matter for the courts to resolve 
and, in my opinion it would be wrong to define a priori an abstract point of 
equilibrium which should anyway be achieved. Indeed, my objective is not to 
question the way each discipline is framed by its own institutions, but to propose the 
establishment of a permanent dialectical relationship between them. My analysis does 
not have the ambition to conceptualize in general IP rights as a form of regulation but 
to find an adequate terminology in the framework of the competition law discourse on 
IP. I will compare the practical implications of the terminology of "regulation" on the 
antitrust law-IP interface with those of the rhetoric of “property rights” and will 
conclude that the terminology of “regulation” is better suited for the constitution of a 
dialectical relation between competition law and intellectual property. This is not to 
deny that IP lawyers may take the view that in other circumstances a property rights 
terminology is more appropriate
6.1. The regulatory theory of intellectual property
The idea is not a new one. In his concurring opinion in the Picard v. United 
Aircraft Corp. in 1942, Judge Frank analysed patents as “public franchises, granted by 
the government, acting on behalf of the public”.248 Endorsing the view that patents 
were monopolies was nevertheless for him “superficial thinking”, as patents may be a 
stimulus to competition and may offer the opportunity to small firms to compete with 
important corporations and attract investors. As Judge Frank puts it, 
“the threat from patent monopolies in the hands of such outsiders may create a 
sort of competition -  a David versus Goliath competition – which reduces the 
inertia of some huge industrial aggregations that might otherwise sluggish”249.
The problem therefore “is not whether there should be monopolies but rather, what 
monopolies there should be, and whether and how much they should be regulated”250. 
If patents are viewed as “public franchises”,
“it is, accordingly, appropriate to ask whether the holder of such a public 
franchise should be permitted, without any governmental control whatever, to 
decide that no public use should be made of the franchise during its life or 
only such public use as the franchise-holder, in its utterly unregulated 
discretion, deems wise, and at such prices as it sees fit to extract. We accord 
no such powers to the holder of a public franchise to run a bus line or to sell 
electric power”251.
Although there are differences between public franchises on networks and 
public franchises for innovation purposes252, the parallelism drawn by Judge Frank is 
particularly useful as it provides a flexible overarching theory and is compatible with 
the historical roots of intellectual property. The protection of new inventions and 
situations of natural monopoly in network industries may indeed be considered as the 
two remaining exceptions to the traditional common law principle of the prohibition 
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of monopolies, now enshrined in competition law. Their nature as exceptions to the 
rule inevitably raises questions concerning possible regulatory constraints to the IP 
holder’s actions. The study of the evolution of public franchises in the late 19th
century can provide an interesting illustration of the inevitable movement of public 
franchises to regulation.253 Patents may also “fit the model of the relational contract, 
particularly if we view the patent owner and the state as engaging in a long-term, open 
ended contract.254
The term ‘regulation’ is predominantly taken to refer to a form of collective 
intervention with the principal objective to address market failures.255 IP rights 
impose obligations on third parties, not as a consequence of a contract, tort or 
voluntary exchange, but because of the direct intervention of the government, which 
aims to “stimulate particular activities to foster the general welfare”.256 Consequently, 
IP rights “have nothing to do with the classical notion of property, but rather have to 
be qualified as a kind of government intervention in the market place”.257 By 
conferring property rights on ideas, the government seeks not only to facilitate market 
transactions, as is the case for physical property rights, but also to correct a market 
failure, which is in this case “free riding that occurs when innovations are too easily 
copied, and the corresponding decrease in the incentive to innovate”.258 This is a fact 
that is often forgotten by the “extreme free marketers”, who “might rail at the 
excesses of regulation or antitrust” but “they tend to accept the system of intellectual 
property rights as if it were handed from a mountaintop”.259 Yet as Hovenkamp 
observes,
“IP laws create property rights. But so do state created exclusive franchises 
and filed tariffs. In fact, the detailed regulatory regimes that we call the IP 
laws are filed with very rough guesses about the optimal scope of protection –
ranging from the duration of patents and copyrights to the scope of patent 
claims and fair use of copyrighted material. The range of government 
estimation that goes on in the IP system is certainly as great as in regulation 
of, say, retail electricity or telephone service. Further, the IP regime is hardly 
immune from the legislative imperfections that public choice theory 
uncovers”.260
Other authors have criticized the reward theory of patents which, according to 
them, “emphasizes only one dimension of the patent instrument – compensation for 
innovation – and ignores the role of patents as means of regulating markets”.261 The 
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same point is also made by Bently and Sherman, for whom patents are “regulatory 
tools” which are used by governments in order to achieve economic as well as non-
economic ends.262 For example, the patent offices should also take into account the 
external effects of the impact of technology on the environment or health.
In their seminal study of the case law of the Federal Circuit on patents, Burk 
and Lemley present the view that patent law is an industry and technology specific 
regulation.263 Different innovation theories, such as prospect theory, incentive theory, 
cumulative innovation theory and anti-commons theory are appropriate for some 
industries and inappropriate for others. This “industry-specific patent theory” may 
explain what would seem otherwise an inconsistent theoretical framework.264
Exploring the enforcement of patents in the US, Burk and Lemley identify several 
‘policy levers’, which help the patent offices and the courts to frame IP doctrines 
which correspond to the needs of cumulative innovators and consumers.265
Intellectual property protection should depend on the characteristics of the industry. 
For example, Burk and Lemley consider that while it is necessary to assure a broad 
patent protection for biotechnological and chemical inventions, “because of their high 
cost and uncertain development process, the opposite is true in the case of software 
development.”266 It is therefore important to protect competition and cumulative 
innovation more than this would be the case with biotechnology or the semi-
conductors industry267. Competition law could be a necessary complement to patent 
law in this case more than it would be in another industry. This does not support the 
existence of sui-generis IP regimes but the development of policy levers within IP law 
that would take into account these sector specific characteristics.268 The existence of 
sector-specific IP protection on semi-conductors, software, medicinal products and 
biotechnology in Europe may however illustrate the point.269
More recent studies insist on the modularity of the concept of exclusion, which
is the characteristic of property rights and the existence of governance mechanisms 
which may be used as complementary strategies for defining property rights: 
“(i)ntellectual property, like property in general, can be seen as (at best) a second-best 
solution to a complex coordination problem of attributing outputs to inputs”.270 The 
analysis of IP rights as falling between the poles of a continuum between property 
rights and liability rules, depending on the information costs involved in the definition 
of these rights or the existence of adequate remedies, injunctive relief or liability rules 
which allow access at a price set by a court or agency, also conceptualizes IP rights as 
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a non-uniform regulatory tool that can be employed according to the circumstances of 
each economic sector.271
6.2. Implications for the competition law-intellectual property interface
The regulatory theory of IP may provide a better platform than the “property 
rights” rhetoric for establishing a dialectical relationship between competition law and 
IP. In particular, it will allow consideration of the internalisation of competition 
concerns within the IP regime, while avoiding the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine.
The example of the Microsoft case is worthy of note. Microsoft argued that 
Article 6 of the EC Software Directive provided an adequate remedy for competition 
law concerns, as it authorised the decompilation of “parts of a software program”, 
without the permission of the copyright holder, if this was “indispensable to obtain the 
information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created 
computer program with other programs”.272 While this possibility was subject to 
certain conditions,273 Microsoft argued that the balancing of IP with competition law 
concerns had already been done by the Software Directive, which provided a standard 
of “full interoperability”.274 Accordingly, the application of Article 82 was redundant 
and would have “upset the careful balance between copyright and competition 
policies struck by the Software Directive”.275
The Commission refused Microsoft’s claims. Taking a dogmatic approach, it 
emphasised the quasi-constitutional character of Article 82, which cannot be 
“superseded” by “secondary Community legislation”.276 The Commission remarked 
that the Software Directive simply provided for a passive duty of interoperability. In 
any event, recital 27 of the Directive explicitly stated that its provisions were without 
prejudice to the application of competition rules under Articles 81 and 82 EC. 
However, while affirming the primacy of Article 82, the Commission examined at 
length Microsoft’s claim that its rival, Sun required a high degree of interoperability 
that went “beyond the full interoperability” requirement of the Software Directive.277
By doing so, it implied that if the Software Directive did not explicitly mention that a 
refusal to grant interoperability might constitute an abuse of a dominant position and 
if Microsoft provided the “full interoperability” required by the Directive, Article 82 
EC might not have applied in this case.278 It was indeed clear that the Software 
Directive avoided adopting measures restraining competition and did not provide any 
express or implied anti-trust immunity. The decompilation requirement that it 
imposed was therefore a minimum standard to achieve.279
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 The CFI did not accept Microsoft’s arguments that the interoperability 
requirement imposed by Article 5 of the contested decision was not consistent with 
the concept of full interoperability envisaged by Directive 91/250 and suggested a 
restrictive definition of this concept as involving a “one-way” interoperability instead 
of the “two-way” relationship that was required by the Commission’s decision.280 The 
Court considered that recital 12 of the 91/250 Directive gave a clear indication that 
interoperability, according to the Directive, implied a two-way relationship and was 
therefore consistent with the full interoperability required by Article 5 of the 
Commission’s decision.281 Nevertheless, the Court also remarked that
“(i)n any event, it must be borne in mind that what is at issue in the present 
case is a decision adopted in application of Article 82 EC, a provision of 
higher rank than Directive 91/250. The question in the present case is not so 
much whether the concept of interoperability in the contested decision is 
consistent with the concept envisaged in that directive as whether the 
Commission correctly determined the degree of interoperability that should be 
attainable in the light of the objectives of Article 82 EC”.282
The Court’s approach has two implications: First, it reaffirms the normative 
hierarchy of the competition provisions of the Treaty with regard to secondary 
legislation adopted in order to enhance the protection of IP rights at the EC level. 
Second, it requires the interpretation of the provisions of the Directive in conformity 
with the competition law provisions of the Treaty, regardless of the specific 
characteristics of the IP rights or the economic sector involved. In Microsoft the Court 
was quick to find that the Commission was right in assessing the degree of 
interoperability by reference to what, in its view, “was necessary in order to enable 
developers of non-Microsoft work group server operating systems to remain viably on 
the market”.283 The Court observed that dominant firms have a “special responsibility, 
irrespective of the causes of that position, not to allow its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition on the common market” and that “if the existing degree of 
interoperability does not enable developers of non-Microsoft work group server 
operating systems to remain viably on the market for those operating systems” the 
maintenance of effective competition on that market would be hindered.284
 The fact that competition law concerns will always trump the IP right of 
exclusion if competitors are marginalised or are forced to exit the market, denotes the 
broad scope of the interoperability duty that is required by the Court and the lack of 
any analysis of the economic and legal context of the specific IP right or economic 
sector. The Court’s one size fits all position can be fully justified in certain industries 
but may prove to be inadequate in others. The necessary balance to achieve between 
the two areas of law should depend on the scope, strength of the IP protection 
provided and the specificities of each economic sector. Mark Lemley interestingly 
observes that “we must treat IP and antitrust law as equals” and that “both IP and 
antitrust are policy tools that can be used to encourage innovation and therefore 
promote dynamic efficiency”.285 This approach implies that competition enforcers 
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should take into account the economy of the particular IP rights, their scope, the 
degree of protection that is needed in order to promote innovation, the possibilities to 
adequately address dissemination concerns within the IP law system, before reaching 
any decision to impose an antitrust remedy. Regardless of the factual situation in the 
Microsoft case, which may ultimately justify the conclusion reached by the 
Commission, the overly restrictive language used by the Court does not leave much 
space to this necessary additional step to the analysis.
One could compare the position of EU law with the “federal regulatory 
immunity” doctrine which applies in US anti-trust law, according to which anti-trust 
should not apply if it were to frustrate the economic goals pursued by a specific 
regulatory regime.286 This “immunity” (the term ‘deference’ is preferable in this case) 
could be either explicitly mentioned by the regulatory statute itself or implied in order 
to avoid conflicts between regulatory and antitrust requirements. Based on this 
doctrine one could advance the position that competition law should not frustrate the 
regulatory goals of IP rights protection. Consequently, competition law will be less 
likely to apply if the IP regime has already internalised competition-like (open access) 
concerns and provided an effective system of remedies that may guarantee an 
adequate level of dissemination of the innovation. This approach avoids an across-the-
board application of competition law which will overlook the particular characteristics 
of the industry and of the specific IP rights.
The absence of extensive Community harmonisation of IP rights may, 
however, be an obstacle to the expansion of this doctrine. Community harmonisation 
of IP rights has also been mainly achieved by directives, which leave to the Member 
States an important margin of discretion regarding the way in which dissemination of 
innovation concerns could finally be implemented.287 It should be possible in this case 
to have recourse to the residual application of competition law. Furthermore, contrary 
to US antitrust law, European competition law does not exempt from competition law 
enforcement, practices that have already been subject to the regulation of a Member 
State, even if this regulation was adopted in compliance with an EU regulatory 
framework.288
It follows that the extent of competition law deference to the IP regime will 
depend on the degree (and detail) of Community harmonisation and the effective 
internalisation of dissemination concerns within the particular IP regime. The 
Community legislature and IP regulators and courts would therefore be in a position 
to define the balance between incentives and dissemination according to the 
characteristics of the particular economic sector or IP regime, without undue 
interference from competition law. Indeed, advocating the existence of a hierarchy 
between intellectual property and competition law, for the simple reason that the latter 
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is a Community competence enshrined in the Founding Treaties, whereas the former 
remains largely a national competence or the product of derivative legislation, is a 
legalistic approach which neglects the fact that both regimes are complementary tools
in the regulation of innovation.
Adopting a regulatory approach to IP will also make possible the 
establishment of interdisciplinary and trans-national networks which will enhance 
interaction between the different patent offices, at the European and national level, 
judges and competition authorities, as is already happening with the European 
regulatory networks in telecommunications, electricity and gas.289 Competition law 
should of course remain the default option in case the IP system does not provide for a 
specific mechanism of promoting innovation ex post grant of the IP right. Indeed, ex 
ante consideration of competition or dissemination concerns may not be an effective 
tool in situations of significant informational uncertainty as to the form of the 
innovation process. The IP authorities and specialist courts may be in a better 
position, in terms of specialist knowledge of the specific industry, than the general 
antitrust courts to devise a remedial structure that will address ex post the specific 
dynamic efficiency or innovation concerns.290
These are some of the implications of the regulatory approach to the 
competition law–IP interface, but other possibilities could also be explored. It is clear, 
however, that the abandonment of the sterile “property rights” approach is a 
prerequisite for establishing a real dialectical relationship between competition law 
and IP that will guarantee the optimal level of innovation in the specific industry. This 
implies, as the first step of the analysis, the clear identification of the risks to 
innovation that would result from an overly broad IP protection.
6.3. Biotechnology as an illustration of the new competition law-IP intersection
Biotechnology is a fairly recent industry that involves the engineering of 
genetic material towards practical ends such as medical and veterinary advances.291
The development of the industry is quite recent, starting with the invention by 
professors Cohen and Boyer of the basic technique for creating recombinant DNA and 
the filing of the first patent application (Cohen-Boyer technology) in November 1974. 
Since then, a number of patents have been issued on research tools, such as 
recombinant DNA technology, on newly discovered and isolated genes or proteins, or 
on methods of treating patients through the use of a particular gene or protein.292
However, “largely by chance, the industry has remained relatively free of broad, 
dominant patents covering basic technology”, at least during the first twenty years of 
its development.293 The biotechnology industry has developed strong links with the 
pharmaceutical industry: basic research identifies potential products and then these 
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are developed through partnerships with the pharma industry in order to test and 
commercialise the product.294 Patents facilitate this process of innovation by attracting 
venture capital and thus making possible for the biotechnology industry to sustain 
innovation through massive R&D investments. The patenting of research tools, such 
as screening technologies, modelling programs or genomic databases spurs the 
process of cumulative innovation, according to the prospect theory of patents. 
Since the seminal Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision of the US Supreme 
Court295, which declared that living organisms produced by human intervention are 
patentable, the trend has been to grant broad patents to the biotechnology industry, in 
particular as the costs and the risks of R&D in this area are particularly high.296 A 
similar trend can be identified in Europe, with the adoption of a specific Directive on 
Biotechnology in 1998 and the broad interpretation of Article 52(1) of the European 
Patent Convention (EPC) in the biotechnology industry, following Rules 26-29 of the 
Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention.297 Biotechnological 
inventions are patentable under the EPC if they concern either (i) a biological material 
which is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical 
process even if it previously occurred in nature, (ii) plants or animals if the technical 
feasibility of the invention is not confined to a particular plant or animal variety or 
(iii) a microbiological or other technical process, or a product obtained by means of 
such a process other than a plant or animal variety.
The grant of broad patents in the biotechnology sector may, however, restrict 
innovation and produce anticompetitive effects essentially in two ways. First, multiple 
property rights may lead to the development of anticommons, which defines a 
situation where owners have claims to separate inputs needed for the same product or 
line of research.298 This situation may increase transaction costs, inventing around 
costs and/or eventually produce a situation of royalty stacking that can ultimately 
harm consumers (exploitative abuses). Second, broad patents on upstream research 
methods may lead to the foreclosure of the development of independent research 
paths that are important in order to promote creative development of early-stage 
research that could lead to the commercialisation of new drugs or will increase 
competition in the downstream market. Blocking patents or patent thickets situations 
may block the process of cumulative innovation and consequently harm final 
consumers (exclusionary abuses).
There are certainly a number of tools to address these concerns. It is possible 
to conclude licensing arrangements, develop open-access regimes by making 
upstream research public (or though copyleft licences) or conclude alliances between 
upstream inventors and multiple downstream companies that will avoid anticommons 
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and will eventually reduce transaction costs. In addition, patent law may develop 
specific instruments that will address these concerns. First, it may ensure that most 
upstream research remains outside the bounds of patentability, by excluding from 
patentability abstract ideas or imposing a requirement of specific, substantial and 
credible utility.299 Second, the patent authorities may develop a narrow interpretation 
of patent claims in the specific industry in situations where broad patent claims will 
create impediments to competition and there is no possibility of inventing around 
even narrow patents.300 Third, the specific patent law regime may recognize the 
existence of an experimental use exemption.301 This possibility is envisaged in 
Europe, where according to Article 9(b) of the Draft Community Patent Regulation,
“acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented
invention” are not found to infringe the patent.302 Furthermore, Article 60(5) of the 
UK Patent Act of 1977 provides also for an experimental use exception as well as in 
situations where the infringement act of the patent is done privately and for purposes 
that are not commercial.303 These exceptions are in conformity with Article 30 of the 
TRIPS agreement, according to which, “(m)embers may provide limited exceptions to 
the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of 
the legitimate interests of third parties”.304 Finally, there is always the possibility of 
compulsory licensing in certain specific circumstances, according to Article 21 of the 
Draft Community Patent or Article 12 of Directive 98/44/EC305. Nevertheless, the 
conditions to apply for compulsory cross-licensing are quite restrictive, as applicants 
must show that
“(a) they have applied unsuccessfully to the holder of the patent or of the plant 
variety right to obtain a contractual licence;
(b) the plant variety or the invention constitutes significant technical progress 
of considerable economic interest compared with the invention claimed in the 
patent or the protected plant variety”306
In practice, the possibility of compulsory licensing is quite limited and does 
not cover all possibilities of restriction of competition and cumulative innovation in 
the downstream market, following a refusal to licence.307 In addition, the European 
Patent Office does not take into account the economic effect of the grant of patents in 
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specific areas of technology and any limitation or exception to the grant of patent 
rights, under Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention, is only confined to 
situations where the commercial exploitation of the invention would be contrary to 
"ordre public" or morality.308
Competition law should in this case intervene in order to address the issues 
left unresolved by the IP regime but should also take into account, as an interpretative 
guide, the need for a relatively broad protection of biotechnological inventions and 
the importance granted to the incentives of the biotechnology companies to invest in 
R & D, as this is clearly identified in Directive 98/44.309 The enforcement of 
competition law in this industry should therefore be extremely cautious and should
avoid the application of overly restrictive to incentives to innovation competition law 
instruments, such as the essential facilities doctrine. Competition law intervention 
should be responsive to the specific anticompetitive effects that have been identified 
in this industry, such as the risk for cumulative innovation following the patenting of 
upstream research tools and the anticommons problem. 
The competition authorities may employ the concept of innovation markets in 
order to tackle the first anticompetitive concern.310 The European Transfer of 
Technology Guidelines provide that, 
“(s)ome licence agreements may affect innovation markets. In analysing such 
effects, however, the Commission will normally confine itself to examining 
the impact of the agreement on competition within existing product and 
technology markets. Competition on such markets may be affected by 
agreements that delay the introduction of improved products or new products 
that over time will replace existing products. In such cases innovation is a 
source of potential competition which must be taken into account when 
assessing the impact of the agreement on product markets and technology 
markets. In a limited number of cases, however, it may be useful and 
necessary to also define innovation markets. This is particularly the case 
where the agreement affects innovation aiming at creating new products and 
where it is possible at an early stage to identify research and development 
poles. In such cases it can be analysed whether after the agreement there will 
be a sufficient number of competing research and development poles left for 
effective competition in innovation to be maintained”.311
Competition law enforcement may also adopt a more permissive approach for 
technological patent pools in this particular industry as patent pools may effectively 
address the anticommons problem and reduce transaction costs.312
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7. Conclusion
The emergence of a particular discourse is often the response to a situation of 
conflict between policies pursuing different objectives. The property rights rhetoric 
has been instrumental in providing some degree of deference to intellectual property 
rights during a period of active anti-trust enforcement. However, circumstances have 
evolved. Innovation has become an objective of competition law. The relationship 
between the two disciplines is no longer antagonistic, but complementary. At the 
same time, intellectual property protection has expanded considerably and is often 
granted to trivial inventions. 
This evolution challenges the usefulness of the property rights approach which 
aimed at defending IP rights against a disproportionate application of competition 
law. In fact, the property rights rhetoric does not contribute to the understanding of 
the need to balance incentives to innovation with that of enhancing cumulative 
innovation to the benefit of the consumers. It is also misleading as the analogy 
between IP rights and property rights on tangibles cannot stand close scrutiny. Indeed, 
from an economic analysis perspective, IP rights present different characteristics from 
property rights on tangibles.
This entails the emergence of different competition law standards in assessing 
refusals to license IP rights from those employed for “normal” property rights. 
Competition law or access concerns have also been internalised in intellectual 
property, which reveals the close links between these two areas of law. On the 
contrary, the rhetoric of “property rights” is static as it visualises IP and competition 
law in separate spheres, and therefore renders more difficult the establishment of a 
dialectical relationship between the two areas. It is submitted that the 
conceptualisation of IP as a form of regulation may provide a useful theoretical basis 
for a better understanding of the interactions between competition law and intellectual 
property. It will make possible the realisation of the objectives of both of these two 
areas of law while also taking into account in assessing the appropriate levels of 
regulation, the specific circumstances of each economic sector.
